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


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CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR  
DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS  
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# THE FUTURE FOR CLIMATE FINANCE IN NEPAL

Government of Nepal  
National Planning Commission  
United Nations Development Programme  
United Nations Environment Programme  
Capacity Development for Development  
Effectiveness Facility for Asia Pacific

Kathmandu  
December 2011



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## PEI Nepal Brief

The Poverty-Environment Initiative (PEI) in Nepal supports poverty reduction and inclusive development by integrating pro-poor climate and environmental concerns into development planning and economic-decision making. The PEI is not designed as a stand-alone project as such but rather it aims to provide a programmatic framework for targeted support to national and local level planning, budgetary and economic decision making processes through ongoing UNDP supported programmes, in particular, Strengthening Planning and Monitoring Capacity of NPC (SPMC-NPC) and the Local Government Community Development Programme (LGCDP). At the national level, the PEI helps strengthen the NPC's capacity to integrate pro-poor climate and environment concerns in the national planning, budgeting and monitoring processes. Similarly, at the local government level, it provides technical support to the Ministry of Local Development (MoLD), and select District Development Committees (DDC) and Village Development Committees (VDC) to integrate pro-poor climate and environment priorities into local level planning and budgeting process with a particular focus on rural infrastructure. The proposed timeframe for PEI in Nepal is 35 months from February 2010 to December 2012. The PEI Programme Framework will complement the existing project documents of the above two projects, which will include the stipulated PEI activities in their respective Project Annual Work Plans (AWPs).

## CDDE Facility Brief

The CDDE Facility was established in March 2009 to meet Asia and the Pacific partner country demand for peer-to-peer initiatives that help them improve the management of their aid partnership in pursuit of development effectiveness and poverty reduction. It is made possible with the financial support of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic of Korea (MoFAT) and UNDP Asia-Pacific Regional Centre in Bangkok, Thailand.



# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Financing climate change development needs, which are increasingly demanding more financial resources, is as much a challenge as developing both short- as well as long-term programmes for effective climate adaptation and mitigation. Several issues from securing globally available funds to channeling it to various programs transparently and to the highest international accountability standards are crucial in climate financing. The fund has to reach the local people who are most affected by the climate change impacts. Existing public financing arrangement must accommodate these needs as climate funding grows in future. Informed planning and decision making require improved access to information on various sources of climate finance in order to integrate climate finance with the national budgetary system. Hence, the Government of Nepal (GoN) carried out the study on the future for climate financing in Nepal so as to identify critical areas for improvement.

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# ABBREVIATIONS

|        |   |        |  |
|--------|---|--------|--|
| ADB    | Asian Development Bank  | MRV    | Monitoring, Reporting and Verification                       |
| AEPC   | Alternative Energy Promotion Centre                                 | NAPA   | National Adaptation Plan of Action                           |
| CCC    | Climate Change Centre   | NDRRC  | Nepal Disaster Risk Reduction Consortium                     |
| DDC    | District Development Committee                                      | NGO    | Non Government Organisation                                  |
| DFID   | Department for International Development, UK                        | ODA    | Official Development Assistance                              |
| ESAP   | Energy Sector Assistance Programme                                  | ODA    | Official Development Assistance                              |
| EU     | European Union  | PAF    | Poverty Alleviation Fund                                     |
| FSF    | Fast Start Finance  | PFM    | Public Finance Management                                    |
| INGO   | International Non Government Organisation                           | PPCR   | Pilot Program for Climate Resilience                         |
| JFA    | Joint Financing Arrangement   | SPCR   | Strategic Program for Climate Resilience                     |
| LAPA   | Local Adaptation Plan of Action                                     | SREP   | Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program for Low Income Countries |
| LB     | Local Body  | SSRP   | School Sector Reform Programme                               |
| LGCDP  | Local Governance and Community Development Programme                | UNDP   | United Nations Development Programme                         |
| MCCICC | Multi-stakeholder Climate Change Initiatives Coordination Committee | UNEP   | United Nations Environment Programme                         |
| MLD    | Ministry of Local Development                                       | UNFCCC | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change        |
| MoE    | Ministry of Environment   | VDC    | Village Development Committee                                |
| MoEd   | Ministry of Education   | WB     | World Bank   |
| MoF    | Ministry of Finance   |        |  |
| MoU    | Memorandum of Understanding   |        |  |



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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- E1. This study has examined the development effectiveness dimensions of climate finance in Nepal. The analysis is based on the premise that the management of climate finance should build on relevant examples of good practice in other areas of public finance management, recognising the likely need for a variety of instruments to deliver climate change programming. As climate finance is at an early, formative stage in Nepal, this paper offers a forward looking perspective on how climate finance may be administered in the years ahead. The paper focuses on the public financing component of climate finance and the role of international support.

## Lesson learning from development practice for climate finance

- E2. The following issues, derived from a review of national development experiences in Nepal, have relevance for climate finance delivery:
1. Budgeting appears the weakest link in the policy, strategy, implementation chain. It is not clear whether this is because it does not receive the attention it deserves, or, because it is the most problematic stage to address.
  2. Meeting the needs of the most vulnerable to climate change will require a strong local finance delivery mechanism. This is where there are already identified weaknesses in the national financial management system.
  3. There is much diversity of structure and processes for the delivery of development finance. It may be expected this will also be the case for climate finance, at least in its initial stages of delivery. A key principle should be to match the finance modality with institutional function and spending objective.
  4. A major weakness is the limited development of results-based frameworks. Little can be gained from the development experience. This represents a significant challenge for climate change actions where performance-related issues hold such prominence.
  5. Improving transparency of climate change actions is a key reform to secure greater accountability of the public administration.
  6. Finally, there appears to be limited engagement with, and recognition of, the important role to be played by the private sector in tackling climate change.

## Establishing a Vision for climate finance in Nepal

- E3. A new climate change policy was approved by the Government of Nepal in January 2011. Whilst this policy is comprehensive in many ways, it does not provide the detail required to define a climate finance framework for Nepal. Defining such a vision for climate finance is something that government should undertake over the next six months to guide the development of new and additional funding flows in the years ahead. Four elements, taken together, could characterise the governance of climate finance in Nepal

in the future. First, the national budget should incorporate all external (official development assistance and climate finance) and domestic revenues, and allocate public finance under strong policy direction, and be accountable to the Parliament. This implies that climate finance will be channelled through the public finance system rather than relying upon a dispersed set of delivery mechanisms. Second, quality assurance and oversight mechanisms for all climate change programming should be established and implemented. Third, an institutional architecture supporting climate change programming should be integrated into appropriate sectors. And finally, any vision of climate finance would be deficient without acknowledging the important role to be played by an active private sector investing in climate resilient growth.

### **Fulfilling this Vision would mean that by 2020:**

- E4. Direct Access to international climate finance should have been established, with the appropriate institutional requirements in place that demonstrate the necessary financial integrity, institutional capacity, transparency and self-investigative powers. Being able to demonstrate these attributes should be the primary concern in determining the most appropriate institutional arrangements for managing global climate change funds.
- E5. Acknowledging the centrality of the national budget, all 'off-budget'<sup>1</sup> external support for climate change activities involving government agencies should have ceased. The value of creating a similar mechanism to that existing in both the health and education sectors at present, with a 'one-door-only' entry point for external partners engaging with national climate change programmes, should have been investigated.
- E6. Donors should have been dissuaded from developing their own projects and programmes on climate change. Government should have prepared a pipeline of investment projects for international funding and encouraged pooled funding through a joint funding arrangement. This will require significant strengthening of financial planning within national processes.
- E7. The mandate of climate change public institutions should have been clarified with a clear separation according to function, recognising the policy formulation role (being Ministry-led), the regulatory role (Departmental-led), the service provision role (which will require determining the appropriate balance between public and private actors), and the potential for national revenue collection (possibly based on carbon taxes).
- E8. An internationally recognised performance-based system should be in place, with strong Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) for all climate finance investments, including those that are channelled to the local level. This will likely require external support in the design and early implementation phases and will require significant strengthening of local government capacity within national processes, particularly through the Ministry of Local Development (MLD).
- E9. Strong engagement of the private sector will have been secured to complement public funding with private investment. (Both SPCR and SREP have much to offer in terms of setting the early investment framework for private sector activity).
- E10. A specific urban strategy to secure climate resilience among the growing urban population should have been developed.

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<sup>1</sup> 'Off-budget' support is external funding that does not pass through the national budgetary system, but relies on parallel structures.

To secure these outcomes, a number of actions over the next year are necessary:

| No. | Priority Action   | Time Frame                        | Lead national institution(s)          |
|-----|---|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1.  | <b>A national Vision for climate finance needs to be drawn up</b> to guide the development of new and additional funding flows that will support climate change actions up to 2020 and beyond.  | High priority - immediate         | NPC, MoE, MLD, Climate Change Council |
| 2.  | There is need to move quickly from project delivery to a programmatic approach for public funding of climate change actions from international sources. <b>Government and its development partners should consider drawing up a Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA) for climate finance</b> , taking the LGCDP JFA as its model. GoN would be represented by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) in all matters pertaining to financial management, with the Ministry of Environment (MoE) as the technical lead (paralleling the MoF/MLD relationship under the LGCDP). <b>International climate funding would be transferred into a foreign currency account at the Nepal Rastra Bank for the exclusive use of national climate change actions. This account would then be used to transfer funding into a new Budget Head within the Red Book of Government's Estimates of Expenditure. This Budget Head would represent the Government's Climate Change Fund.</b> Funding for individual projects/programmes could then be identified by sub-heads in cases where there was agreement over the further ear-marking of external funding. | High priority - immediate         | MoF, MoE                              |
| 3.  | <b>The design of the SPCR, SREP and LAPA programmes will provide important early precedents for national climate change programmes.</b> In all three cases, the financial arrangements appear yet to be finalized. This provides an opportunity to build the type of nationally owned system envisaged in the previous recommendation.  | High priority - next three months | MoF, MoE, MLD                         |
| 4.  | <b>A separate arrangement for the provision of technical assistance to climate change programmes should be developed</b> , again following existing national models (e.g. LGCDP, SSRP). The arrangements for implementing a pooled mechanism, possibly through the UN system, require further investigation.  | High priority - next three months | NPC, MoE, MLD                         |
| 5.  | The early creation of further new structures for climate change management brings with it certain risks (namely a diversion and dissipation of effort); there is much need to strengthen the existing structures in the short term (e.g. the MoE's role as the country's focal agency for climate change) and then to build further institutional capacity as resources permit. <b>The policy commitment to create a climate change centre could be quickly accomplished through the re-designation of the climate change management division within the MoE, without undermining the options available for its long-term institutional setting.</b>  | High priority - next six months   | NPC, MoE                              |

| No  | Priority Action  | Time Frame                              | Lead national institution(s) |
|-----|--|---|------------------------------|
| 6.  | As climate change activities start with the flow of new and additional finance, there will be a premium to keep a strategic focus on early implementation to secure lesson learning. <b>The two national programmes supported by the Climate Investments Funds, the SPCR and SREP, will provide important early experience in the implementation of climate change related actions and should therefore be managed in an inclusive way.</b> The focus on involving private sector actors within both programmes is noteworthy and should be used to energise public policy engagement with the private sector at scale.  | High priority<br>- next twelve months   | NPC, MoE, MLD                |
| 7.  | <b>Wider government reforms will be important for the efficient use of climate finance</b> , in particular the further strengthening of the country's public financial management system. Comprehensive implementation of the 2007 Public Procurement Act would increase confidence in public expenditure controls. The strategic, multi-year allocation of resources to climate change actions through the Medium Term Expenditure Framework is another area of PFM reform that warrants attention.   | High priority<br>- next twelve months   | MoF                          |
| 8.  | <b>A climate finance sub-committee of the MCCICC should be established</b> to take forward the climate finance agenda and to act as a national discussion group on climate finance.  | Medium priority<br>- immediate          | MoE, MoF                     |
| 9.  | <b>The possibility of tracking climate change public expenditure within the national budget should be explored with the MoF.</b> This should build on the existing examples of gender and pro-poor budget tracking within the national budget, as well as the Ministry's aid information management system. A system should be designed that addresses the issue of identifying the incremental cost of making sector programmes 'climate resilient' across all sectors of the economy, as well as tracking climate expenditure flows to the local level. It should avoid solely taking a projectised approach to the tagging of climate-related expenditure. <b>In the first instance, a design workshop (involving financial statisticians, economists and climate specialists) should be held to address the design issues of tracking climate finance.</b> | Medium priority<br>- next three months  | MoF, MoE, MLD                |
| 10. | <b>The Government should create a public website to act as the national information hub on all climate change actions</b> (and be linked to the financial information at the Ministry of Finance as indicated in the previous recommendation). This should not require significant investment, but government should give priority to making such information available and not to rely on projectised activity.   | Medium priority<br>- next three months  | MoE                          |
| 11. | <b>An early effort should be made to identify and record all international support for climate change actions undertaken within the country by NGOs.</b> The MCCICC may be the appropriate forum to champion such an exercise due to its national coordination function. This information should be placed in the public domain using a web-based information portal. Civil society has an obligation to demonstrate high standards of transparency and accountability for the financial resources that it manages.  | Medium priority<br>- next twelve months | MoE                          |

The above actions need to be complemented by two further fundamental reforms that will likely take more time to address:

- E11. First, it will be most important to secure the right structures at the local level to ensure that the flow of climate finance reaches the most vulnerable communities. This will require the creation of capacity within existing district level structures. Lessons learned from the LGCDP can be drawn upon to develop mechanisms to improve local institutional capacity and accountability to implement climate change programmes. A mapping of VDC, Municipalities and DDC functions, powers, capacities and relationships would be a good starting point to identify potential local actors that could take lead roles in managing the finance and development of climate change programmes at the local level.
- E12. Second, further thought is needed on how best to channel funding for climate change to all parts of the economy. An important point of principle is that such funding should pass through the national budget and be made available to all sectors for climate-related work programmes through the annual bidding round of the annual budget. A role for the MoE/CCC would be to provide the technical support to both central ministries as well as LBs to ensure that the financing bids submitted reflect the incremental costs of operating service provision in a changing climate. This reform programme will require close collaboration between MoE and MoF and represents a major undertaking for the effective and efficient delivery of climate finance.
- E13. All of these issues now require further investigation and development to arrive at the most appropriate architecture for climate finance in Nepal.

## 1. Introduction

1. This study has examined the development effectiveness dimensions of climate finance in Nepal. The analysis is based on the premise that the management of climate finance should build on relevant examples of good practice in other areas of public finance management, recognising the likely need for a variety of instruments to deliver climate change programming. As climate finance is at an early, formative stage in Nepal, this paper offers a forward looking perspective on how climate finance may be administered in the years ahead. The paper focuses on the public financing component of climate finance and the role of international support.
2. The study is part of a broader effort by UNDP to strengthen the capacity of national and local level institutions to manage scaled-up climate finance, leading to the development of a climate fiscal framework at the national level. Such a framework will require clarity on climate-related public expenditure, improved institutional coordination between sectors and different levels of government, with strengthened fiduciary risk and public finance management.
3. The research also builds on a set of country studies carried out in 2010 that examined emerging climate change financing modalities. This led to a regional dialogue in Bangkok in October 2010, where a call was made to secure quality standards for climate finance within the countries of the region. The dialogue was facilitated by the Capacity Development for Development Effectiveness (CDDE) Facility and brought together participants representing the seven governments of Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Nepal, Indonesia, Philippines and Viet Nam, as well as the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, eight development partners and international agencies (ADB, AUSAID, JICA, OECD, SIDA, UNDP, UNEP, World Bank) and representatives from parliaments and civil society.

### 1.1 Climate finance defined

4. As most recently re-stated within the 2010 Cancun Agreements, climate finance has been defined within the context of the UNFCCC negotiations. Much emphasis is given to climate finance being ‘new and additional’, of it being ‘adequate and predictable’ and to defining the expected levels of international finance to be made available to developing countries over both the short to medium-term.

#### The 2010 Cancun Agreements of the UNFCCC

‘2 (d). Mobilization and provision of scaled-up, new, additional, adequate and predictable financial resources is necessary to address the adaptation and mitigation needs of developing countries.’

‘95. Takes note of the collective commitment by developed countries to provide new and additional resources, ..., approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010–2012, with a balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation.’

‘98. Recognizes that developed country Parties commit, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries’

5. There is already considerable complexity associated with different sources, agents and channels for climate finance. At the national level, there are six different channels through which climate finance might flow in Nepal. First, through a national entity specifically for climate finance (which would need to be created); second, through traditional official development assistance (ODA) channels; third, through new and additional public finance from industrialised countries; fourth, through the emerging (but uncertain) carbon market; fifth, through private sector investment; and finally, through resources made available through the national budget. It is hard to determine the relative contribution that each channel has made to-date, but the likelihood is that traditional ODA has been a significant source of early financing.
6. Climate finance is needed to meet the additional costs brought about by climate change. These incremental costs will be incurred by most sectors of the economy and will affect both investment programmes and the recurrent expenditure of government spending. The challenge will be to identify the level of 'top up' required for each sector and then ensure an effective mechanism is in place so that this level of finance can be accessed. Climate finance therefore represents a very significant mainstreaming challenge for public finance management and can be likened to a new funding stream across the whole of the national budget. The administration of climate finance therefore calls for a prominent role to be played by the Ministry of Finance. It also suggests that a projectised approach to climate change is not the most strategic route to take; rather a revision of the public sector finances will be required.

This represents a very considerable challenge for a country such as Nepal where much development effort has focused at the sector (and sub-sector) level.

## **1.2 Climate finance delivery**

7. Significant progress has been made in establishing a coherent institutional architecture in response to the climate change challenges that now face Nepal. A Climate Change Council has been established, chaired by the Prime Minister, to provide overall policy coordination and guidance on climate change matters. A Multi-stakeholder Climate Change Initiatives Coordination Committee (MCCICC), chaired by the Secretary of the Ministry of Environment, promotes functional level coordination and information sharing. The Ministry of Environment (MoE) acts as the Government's climate change focal point, with senior staff representing Nepal at the international negotiations of the UNFCCC. A climate change management division was created within MoE in 2010 to provide further focus for national oversight on climate change. These are all new structures that will take time to become established as capacity develops over the next five to ten years.
8. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) manages the public finances and oversees the implementation of the Annual Budget. The MoF has a Foreign Aid Coordination Division and has experience of working with several modalities for development finance, some of which may be relevant for the uptake of international public climate finance. First, is budget support where external funding passes directly into the government treasury. This is as yet a little developed approach in



Nepal. Second, is ear-marked support where external funding is reflected on-budget, but is channelled directly to central government programmes through dedicated foreign exchange accounts within the national bank. This modality has increased in recent years as programmatic support has developed. Third, is ear-marked support disbursed to communities and Local Bodies. These funds are also considered 'on-budget'. The fourth system is off-budget funding by donors, where finance is paid directly to the concerned implementing agency (often NGOs and INGOs).

9. The Ministry of Local Development (MLD) will likely play an important role in channelling climate finance down to the local level. The MLD holds two functions: (i) local governance support to Local Bodies (LBs) through grant disbursement and (ii) support for local infrastructure. It is not a line ministry as such. In the context of climate finance it provides an important link between the central and local government administration, where the District Development Committees (DDCs) act as the main channel for public service delivery.
10. Nepal has a longstanding relationship with international donors built up over many years of aid delivery. The UN agencies, bilateral agencies and the development banks all have a significant presence in Nepal and exert influence over government's development agenda. These same agencies are now prominent in the delivery of international support for the actions and programmes required as a result of climate change within the country.

### 1.3 Current and planned climate finance flows

11. The ADB, DANIDA, DFID, EU, Finland, UNDP, UNEP, USAID, WB and others have provided or are in the process of designing climate change related programmes. Fourteen development partners and the Ministry of Environment signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 2 September 2009 that lists a set of principles to guide development partners' support on climate change. This MoU provides the basis for donors that are offering technical support and financial resources for climate change activities to act in a coordinated and coherent manner.
12. A first approximation of the level of donor support for climate change actions (up to March, 2010) is summarised in Table 1. Approximately USD 650 million of international public grant finance has been made available over the last decade, with support increasing in the last five years. However, until a national database is established, with well defined categories of expenditure, this estimate can only be considered an indicative one. Of the 71 projects listed by donors, the largest number has been capacity strengthening and awareness raising activities (Figure 1). In terms of spending on mitigation activities, projects aiming to strengthen the provision of clean (renewable) energy predominate. The dominant external actor, in terms of both number of initiatives supported and the amount of finance committed, is the World Bank.

**Table 1. A first approximation of donor funding for climate change in Nepal**


| No. | Donor       | Number of climate change related initiatives | Timeline     | Amount committed up to 2014 (USD million) |
|-----|-------------|--|--------------|---|
| 1   | ADB         | 8  | -            | 56.2                                      |
| 2   | Denmark     | 4  | 2007 onwards | 30.7                                      |
| 3   | EU          | 3  | 2004 onwards | 23.5                                      |
| 4   | Finland     | 3  | 2009 onwards | 10.4                                      |
| 5   | Germany     | 5  | 1997 onwards | 40.2                                      |
| 6   | Japan       | 7  | 2004 onwards | 12.7                                      |
| 7   | Norway      | 5  | 2002 onwards | 33.6                                      |
| 8   | Switzerland | 4  | 2008 onwards | 20.7                                      |
| 9   | UK          | 5  | 2009 onwards | 42.5                                      |
| 10  | UN          | 8  | 2008 onwards | 2.5                                       |
| 11  | World Bank  | 20   | 2006 onwards | 379.4                                     |
|     | TOTAL       | 71   |              | 652.4                                     |

**Source:** World Bank

13. All of the above financial support is categorised as official development assistance, with delivery managed by bilateral development agencies and the multilateral development banks. It therefore represents an evolutionary approach to the provision of climate finance, involving the same actors and systems that have characterised the delivery of development finance over many years.

14. In terms of providing new and additional resources for climate change actions, industrialised countries' commitment to 'Fast Start Finance' (FSF) – the global commitment to reach USD 30 billion by 2012 – offers another perspective. Estimates of such resources remain hard to come by, although this should change with the commitment made in the 2010 Cancun Agreements for annual reporting on FSF.

**Figure 1. Indicative thematic breakdown of donor supported climate change projects**



Source: World Bank

15. A first indication of the level of FSF reaching Nepal is provided in Table 2, which is a summary of FSF provided by European countries for the first year of the three year period, 2010, as reported by the European Commission. The EU has made an early attempt to promote transparency over such commitments, however, it has had difficulty in summarising the spending of its 28 Member States (MSs). Only five MSs recorded making contributions to Nepal in 2010 and even for these MSs the complete picture is hard to determine.

For example, the contributions made by the Netherlands are not disaggregated down to country level so it is not possible to determine the amount received in Nepal, and the European Commission recorded having made a contribution for a programme that has yet to start. Much remains to be done to improve information provision on international climate finance flows. Recipient country spending should be recorded within country, which would allow for the validation of estimates made internationally by contributor countries.

**Table 2. EU Member States reported contributions to Fast Start Finance for Nepal in 2010**

| Donor               | Beneficiary country           | Thematic Area             | Project title  | Implementation period  | Implementation agency            | Contribution (€ million) | Type (grant / loan) |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|--|--|----------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|
| Cyprus              | Nepal                         | Adaptation                | EU/DFID Project Building climate resilience in Nepal         | 36 Months from signing Financing Agreement between EU/DFID and Nepal | DFID                             | 0.6                      | Grant               |
| European Commission | Nepal                         | Adaptation                | Building climate resilience in Nepal                         | 2011-2013  | DFID                             | 7.0                      | Grant               |
| Finland             | Nepal                         | Adaptation                | Increased capacity hydro meteorological services ICI project | 2010-2012  | Finnish Meteorological Institute | 0.5                      | Grant               |
| Germany             | 4 countries including Nepal   | Adaptation                | FSF of adaptation to climate change in Asia                  | July 2010 - December - 2010  | GIZ                              | 2.7                      | Grant               |
| Netherlands         | 17 countries, including Nepal | Mitigation                | Energising development                                       | 2009-2013  | GIZ                              | 68.0                     | Grant               |
| Netherlands         | 6 countries including Nepal   | Mitigation                | SREP   | 2009-2013  | World Bank                       | 54.0                     | Grant               |
| Netherlands         | 21 countries, including Nepal | Adaptation and Mitigation | Climate resilience   | 2009-2014  | Red Cross and Red Crescent       | 20.8                     | Grant               |
| UK                  | Nepal                         | All                       | Support to climate change programme                          | 2010-2011  | -                                | 0.2                      | Grant               |

**Source:** European Commission, Staff Working Document, *EU Accountability Report 2011 on Financing for Development*

## 2 A Vision for climate finance in Nepal

1. A new climate change policy was approved by the Government of Nepal in January 2011. Whilst this policy is comprehensive in many ways, it does not provide the detail required to define a climate finance framework for Nepal. Defining such a vision for climate finance is something that government should undertake over the next six months to guide the development of new and additional funding flows in the years ahead. Such an exercise could build on the 2009 compact on climate change and involve the National Planning Commission, the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Local Development as lead agencies. It will be important to secure this national vision quickly; otherwise there is the danger that the international discourse may dominate national priorities and opportunities.
- 2.1 Elements of the Vision**
2. Four elements, taken together, could characterise the governance of climate finance in Nepal in the future. They can be considered as operating principles that will ensure that climate finance is delivered in an efficient, effective and equitable manner.
  3. First, the national budget should incorporate all external (ODA and climate finance) and domestic revenues, and allocate public finance under strong policy direction, and be accountable to the Parliament. This implies that climate finance will be channelled through the public finance system rather than relying upon a dispersed set of delivery mechanisms. Coordination challenges are already emerging associated with the different channels of climate finance and these can only become more acute in the absence of an overall national coordination mechanism, such as that provided by the national budget.
  4. Second, quality assurance and oversight mechanisms for all climate change programming should be established and implemented, particularly at the local level where programmes are delivered. This will require that the public financial management system is able to budget, track and report on climate finance (both international and domestic) through all sectors. There is already experience upon which to build, associated with the mainstreaming of cross-cutting policy concerns within the annual budget. A gender responsive budget was introduced in 2007, with pro-poor budgeting having been established a year earlier. Both of these initiatives have helped to strengthen the link between policy objectives and resource allocation by making spending decisions more explicit and therefore open to scrutiny.
  5. Third, an institutional architecture supporting climate change programming should be integrated into appropriate sectors. Policy leadership on climate change issues has already been demonstrated by MoE through its strong coordination role in establishing six sector working groups, each led by a different line ministry, under the National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA). Important roles will also need to be played by MoF and MLD, with regard to financial planning and local-level implementation respectively. This requires a more clearly defined role for MLD in bridging national finance and local level implementation.
  6. Finally, any vision of climate finance would be deficient without acknowledging

the important role to be played by an active private sector investing in climate resilient growth. An enabling regulatory environment should exist to promote investment, with public finance being used to leverage further private capital flows in key sectors of the economy.

## 2.2 Outcomes of the Vision

7. To fulfil this vision would require that by 2020 a number of actions will have taken place. All of the following measures represent significant reform over the present situation, but they are all capable of implementation should they have political support.
    - i. Direct Access to international climate finance should have been established, with the appropriate institutional requirements in place that demonstrate the necessary financial integrity, institutional capacity, transparency and self-investigative powers. Being able to demonstrate these attributes should be the primary concern in determining the most appropriate institutional arrangements for managing global climate change funds.
    - ii. Acknowledging the centrality of the national budget, all 'off-budget' external support for climate change activities involving government agencies should have ceased. The value of creating a similar mechanism to that existing in both the health and education sectors at present, with a 'one-door-only' entry point for external partners engaging with national climate change programmes, should have been investigated.
    - iii. Donors should have been dissuaded from developing their own projects and programmes on climate change. Government should have prepared a pipeline of investment projects for international funding and encouraged pooled funding through a joint funding arrangement. This will require significant strengthening of financial planning within national processes.
  - iv. The mandate of climate change public institutions should have been clarified with a clear separation according to function, recognising the policy formulation role (being Ministry-led), the regulatory role (Departmental-led), the service provision role (which will require determining the appropriate balance between public and private actors), and the potential for national revenue collection (based on carbon taxes).
  - v. An internationally recognised performance-based system should be in place, with strong Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) for all climate finance investments, including those that are channelled to the local level. This will likely require external support in the design and early implementation phases and will require significant strengthening of local government capacity within national processes, particularly through MLD.
  - vi. Strong engagement of the private sector will have been secured to complement public funding with private investment. (Both SPCR and SREP have much to offer in terms of setting the early investment framework for private sector activity).
  - vii. A specific urban strategy to secure climate resilience among the growing urban population should have been developed.
8. This set of actions represents a potential medium-term strategy for strengthening the administration of climate finance in Nepal.

### 3. Learning from recent experience with development finance

#### 3.1 A review of development initiatives

1. Climate finance represents a new flow of international funding available to Nepal. Being new, it is not constrained by having to follow what has happened in the past. Also, climate finance is not development finance. However, an obvious operating principle is that this new funding should be utilised in an efficient and effective way, with the needs of those most vulnerable to climate change not being ignored. Paying attention to the effectiveness of climate finance is an important consideration in terms of how well actions that are funded lead to the desired result, in this case the strengthening of national (and sub-national) adaptive capacity to climate change and the mitigation of carbon emissions.
2. The working hypothesis for this study is that climate finance will be effective, efficient and equitable in its delivery if the following characteristics can be demonstrated: (i) there is national ownership over funding decisions; (ii) all external support is aligned and harmonised; (iii) there is a focus on the delivery of results; and (iv) there is mutual accountability between government and its international partners. These characteristics are the same as those that have helped guide improvements in development practice in recent years, as documented in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
3. To explore this hypothesis, the following initiatives have been reviewed through the lens of the development effectiveness principles:
  - The Local Governance and Community Development Programme
  - The Poverty Alleviation Fund
  - The Nepal Peace Funds
  - The School Sector Reform Programme
  - The Alternative Energy Promotion Centre
  - The Nepal Disaster Risk Reduction Consortium
4. These represent a variety of financing modalities and implementation models where government has worked with its development partners to secure improvements in development outcomes. The lessons learned from these management experiences can feed into the design of practical arrangements for coordinating and financing the climate change response in Nepal. Table 3 provides a summary description of these initiatives; Annex 2 provides further detail on each.

**Table 3. Summary descriptions of six development initiatives**

| Initiative  | Implementation modality  | Governance issues   | Financing issues  |
|---|--|---|---|
| <b>The Local Governance and Community Development Programme (LGCDP)</b> | A model for long-term sustainability under strong national ownership. Implementation undertaken by the MLD using government systems.   | A National Advisory Committee oversees strategic implementation, chaired by the Secretary MLD. Joint DP meetings support coordination among a broad range of development partners.  | Employs current government financial procedures. Challenges in fiduciary management related to the national spread of the programme, as local institutional capacity is low. Success of the Joint Funding Arrangement (JFA), with donor support well aligned and harmonised.                                  |
| <b>The Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF)</b>                               | A model for short-term impact, with strong results-based approach. Parallel initiative to LGCDP: same goal, but with different players employing different methods. Service provision delivered largely through the private sector and NGOs. | Legal identity created by the 2006 PAF Act- an autonomous institution. PAF Board chaired by the Prime Minister. PAF Secretariat led by an Executive Director. Two supporting DPs: the World Bank and IFAD.                  | Direct flow of funds to communities, with central budgetary support being channelled directly to community groups.  |
| <b>The Nepal Peace Funds</b>  | A model for short-term impact, with two complementary trust funds. A national fund and the UN trust fund support different actors (state and non-state).   | Both funds overseen by a Board, chaired by the Minister of Peace and Reconstruction. Donor Group provides advice to the Board. Good use of websites promoting transparency.   | Funds for the national trust fund are deposited in the Central Treasury under the terms of the JFA. The Board is fully authorized to approve projects and may draw from an account in the central bank. The Multi-Donor Trust Fund office of the UNDP acts as the administrative agent for the UN trust fund. |
| <b>The School Sector Reform Programme (SSRP)</b>                        | A model for long-term sustainability under strong national ownership. Implementation undertaken by the MoEd using government systems. This sector-wide approach has developed over almost 20 years.  | Joint Steering Committee exists for Direct Funding & TA only. A Code of Conduct, the JFA and the Governance and Accountability Action Plan are key documents that contribute to the governance framework for the SSRP SWAp. | Employs current government financial procedures. Challenges have arisen over the quality of government financial reporting. JFA in place with nine DPs.   |
| <b>The Alternative Energy Promotion Centre (AEPC)</b>                   | A Centre dependent on international funding for over 80% of its funding, with a focus on service provision (not a regulatory body).  | Legal identity created by the 1956 Development Board Act - a semi-autonomous institution. AEPC Board chaired by the Minister of Environment.  | Individual financed project support, some of which is over a decade old. JFA for one project indicates the start of a move towards programmatic support. The rural energy fund has been constrained by the challenges of limited capacity at the local level.   |
| <b>The Nepal Disaster Risk Reduction Consortium</b>                     | A consortium approach, with participating organizations remaining autonomous in implementing programme activities, but agree to contribute to a prioritized set of actions.  | Steering Committee established, chaired by the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, with Secretariat established within the MoHA. Good demonstration of division of labour between DPs.                                     | The funding of 'flagship programmes' is undertaken largely through project financing.   |

Source: Author's own research



5. These initiatives display a number of common instruments that have promoted a move towards a programmatic approach for development that is firmly under national ownership:

- The establishment of National Coordination Bodies, with various consultative mechanisms for interaction with development partners
- Joint Financing Agreements
- Codes of Conduct
- Governance and Accountability Action Plans
- Transparency of information through the use of web-based platforms

6. Delivery of targeted assistance at the local level is, and will likely remain, a major challenge as the experiences of several of the above initiatives have demonstrated. Local capacity remains limited in the absence of an elected local government structure.

7. The following sections examine the experience gained by these initiatives under each of the main effectiveness principles and consider their relevance to the application of climate finance.

### **3.2 National policy, planning and budgeting**

8. Within development practice, it is recognised that countries should exercise leadership over their national policies and strategies and should coordinate development actions involving international partners. In Nepal, climate change policy and planning appear to be advancing well in this regard, with national policy processes having made very considerable progress over a short

period of time in a broad, participatory manner. However, financial planning appears less well developed, particularly in terms of costing proposed public sector investments, where estimated budgets appear first approximations only (as suggested by the one line summary of costs for each of the nine priority activities identified by the NAPA process).

9. There is a widespread use of Programme Steering Committees for major new public sector investments, often chaired at ministerial level to secure support for the mainstreaming of actions across different sector ministries. This is particularly relevant for any national response to climate change (and is reflected in the proposed SPCR governance structure).

10. There are very considerable capacity development issues to be addressed to ensure a strong climate change government strategy. External support through both the ADB technical assistance project to the MoE and the forthcoming SPCR component 3 will be important early investments at the central ministry level. However, as several development initiatives have shown, much of the challenge will lie in securing delivery of services at the local level. The proposed development of local adaptation plans of action (LAPAs) to implement adaptation actions for communities in a number of districts of Mid and Far West Nepal will be a strategic investment in this regard. With the national climate change policy explicitly stating that 'at least 80 percent of the total funds available for climate change activities flow to the grass roots level' much attention needs to focus on the mechanics of local fund management to ensure this will happen in an efficient manner.

11. The experience of development finance flows suggest at least two different models to secure local level service delivery: one where funding passes through central ministries to Local Bodies (the LGCDP model) and one where central funds pass directly to community groups (the PAF model). There appear advantages and disadvantages to both approaches, simply characterized by the difference between an emphasis on short-term, high impact as opposed to an approach that gives greater weight to long-term, institutional development. The early LAPA experience will offer important insights and the expectation of a re-emergence of local government will also have a significant impact on finance delivery modes.

### 3.3 Alignment of external support

12. International support should be based on countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures if it is to be effective. In Nepal, progress appears mixed in the move to align external support with government systems. Strongest progress appears to have been made at the strategy level, and it is weakest when it comes to donors following government procedures. There is least alignment over the use of the national financial management system, with widespread continuing reliance on external fiduciary controls as some donors lack confidence in the national system.

13. The financial management system in Nepal comprises six stages: (a) the annual budget is approved by the Parliament; (b) the Ministry of Finance authorises spending by the Secretary of each Ministry; (c) the Secretary sends authority to implementing agencies;

(d) the implementing agencies send authority to the different cost centres; (e) the Financial Controller General's Office (FCGO) at the centre and its district level offices release funds to the cost centres and carry out internal audits; and finally, (f) the Auditor General's Office, a constitutional body, conducts the final audit each year. There has been much concern raised over weaknesses at the local level, where expenditure recording has often been poor (in part caused by the very considerable communication challenges in remote mountainous areas). The recent establishment of the Local Bodies Fiscal Commission within the MLD is an important initiative to strengthen the capacity of local auditors; as is the development of social audits at the community level. This reform effort is of strategic importance to strengthen the foundation of the national system to allow for the uptake of international public climate finance.

14. With development financing, after many years of 'off-budget' activity there are moves to 'on-budget' expenditure with the transition from stand-alone projects to programmatic support for government-led actions (e.g. the SSRP). The national budget also provides the opportunity for international partners to move from earmarked support (e.g. LGCDP) to sector support (e.g. SSRP) through the use of an increasing number of Budget Heads into which external funding can be channelled. In this transition to programmatic support there are examples of project management units being embedded within the relevant ministry and staffed by civil servants (e.g. LGCDP); elsewhere, separate project implementation units continue to operate for some climate change relevant actions (e.g. ESAP).

### 3.4 Harmonised and coordinated action

15. An important lesson learned from development practice is that the actions of international partners need to become more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective. This represents a particular challenge for Nepal, where a diversity of donor positions on both development and climate finance is apparent. This is reflected in the differing ways that donors work with government and in the spectrum of projectised to programmatic support. There are examples of donors successfully coming together, as in the LGCDP and the SSRP, but in some cases this is limited by the institutional policies of some donor organizations. The increasing use of Joint Funding Arrangements is an important tool to assist the harmonization of external support.

16. Some important innovation is occurring within climate-related programmes. For example, the flagship coordinators in the NDRRC appear to offer potential for a more effective division of labour by donors and in stimulating a more harmonized way of working under national ownership. These coordinators, together with their government focal points, are responsible for coordinating activities, sharing information about ongoing and planned projects, and ensuring appropriate consultation among relevant partners. In fulfilling this role, they are accountable to the Steering Committee of the NDRRC. This responds well to the principle of comparative advantage, where institutional contributions are determined by the level of competency available within any thematic area. Although climate change represents a major policy

concern for many development partners, within-country expertise appears quite limited. There is also widespread use of joint donor advisory groups at the project level to promote harmonisation; securing this at the national level appears to be developing well through the regular meetings of the Multi-stakeholder Climate Change Initiatives Coordination Committee (MCCICC).

17. The issue of external financial support to civil society is potentially somewhat contentious. The challenge at present is to secure greater awareness of the many actions being undertaken in response to climate change across the whole country. Much externally supported NGO action remains unknown to government, raising the danger of duplication of effort and poor coordination.

### 3.5 Managing for results

18. In recent years, much international attention has focused on managing public resources and improving the decision making process so that it makes a clear link to results. However, it appears this is an area where the development rhetoric is much in advance of the reality of present day systems. Managing for results is at an early stage of development within Nepal and it is not immediately clear what type of result is relevant for climate change programmes, beyond 'greater resilience' to climate change.

19. Perhaps the single most important tool in managing public finances effectively is the national budget. However, at present it is not possible to estimate total public expenditure on climate change actions as a tracking system for this across-sector expenditure has yet to be put in place.

20. There is potential for strengthening a 'managing for results' orientation within the government administration by moving beyond a reliance on traditional input indicators. Local examples of best practice offer good lesson learning opportunities. The Poverty Alleviation Fund produces a results matrix each year, which is subject to review. The matrix consists of mostly output and some outcome indicators. Impact evaluation studies have also been undertaken, based on earlier baseline research. One key lesson is the need to undertake such baseline studies at an early stage, so that future progress can be credibly assessed.

21. One of the more advanced examples of results-based management within the government administration is to be found in the MoEd, which has made considerable investments in monitoring outputs through a monitoring division within the Ministry. An example cited was the yearly target for net enrolment of schoolchildren. All schools report against this standard, with two reporting periods each year. Where the target is not met there is a system to apply remedial actions. However, capacity constraints remain a challenge, in particular the ministry is in need of improved IT equipment to manage the system efficiently.

22. The results framework of the SPCR can be expected to be influential for future climate change actions, being the first such framework drawn up for a national climate programme. Further investment will be required to strengthen this framework so that clear outcomes, with measurable success indicators can be identified. At present, there are noticeable differences in the type of expected result and indicators between components. Most discussion to-date is

reported to have focused on component 1 (Building climate resilience of watersheds in mountain eco-systems). Component 4 (Building climate resilient communities through private sector participation) is considered the least well developed.

### 3.6 Accountability and transparency

23. A key principle of public administration is accountability. This appears a challenging area for government and donors alike, and therefore requires considerable sensitivity and understanding between partners as to who is accountable to whom. Accountability between different levels of government represents a particular challenge in Nepal. Initiatives such as the Local Bodies Fiscal Commission within the MLD appear to be making good progress in strengthening accountability systems and may be able to offer guidance on how to secure accountable climate finance flows down to the local level.

24. Accountability is being codified at both the institutional and programme levels through (i) the use of institutional MoUs (e.g. between PAF & MLD); and (ii) JFAs defining key accountabilities between government and donors. The use of tools such as partnership Codes of Conduct and Governance and Accountability Action Plans appear to offer promise for improved mutual accountability at the programme level.

25. New technology is assisting the move to greater transparency. Many programme documents are now freely available on-line and most major development investments have dedicated websites. However, financial information appears the least transparent and securing comprehensive statements on public investments remains a challenge.

### 3.7 Identifying the main lessons for climate finance

26. The following issues, which have come out of this review of development experiences, have relevance for climate finance delivery in Nepal:

- i. Budgeting appears the weakest link in the policy, strategy, implementation chain. It is not clear whether this is because it does not receive the attention it deserves, or, because it is the most problematic stage to address.
- ii. Meeting the needs of the most vulnerable to climate change will require a strong local finance delivery mechanism. This is where there are already identified weaknesses in the national financial management system.
- iii. There is much diversity of structure and processes for the delivery of development finance. It may be expected this will also be the case for climate finance, at least in its initial stages of delivery. A key principle should be to match the finance modality with institutional function and spending objective.
- iv. A major weakness is the limited development of results-based frameworks. Little can be gained from the development experience. This represents a significant challenge for climate change actions where performance-related issues hold such prominence.
- v. Improving transparency of climate change actions is a key reform to secure greater accountability of the public administration.
- vii. Finally, there appears to be limited engagement with, and recognition of, the important role to be played by the private sector in tackling climate change.

## 4. Next steps in moving forward on climate finance

1. Based on the analysis in the previous section and consistent with a trajectory to secure the vision for climate finance described earlier in the paper, a number of immediate actions are called for. These are listed below.

### 4.1 Recommendations for early action

2. There is need to move quickly from project delivery to a programmatic approach for public funding for climate change actions from international sources. Government and its development partners should consider drawing up a Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA) for climate finance, taking the LGCDP JFA as its model. GoN would be represented by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) in all matters pertaining to financial management, with the Ministry of Environment (MoE) as the technical lead (paralleling the MoF/MLD relationship under the LGCDP). International climate funding would be transferred into a foreign currency account at the Nepal Rastra Bank for the exclusive use of national climate change actions. This account would then be used to transfer funding into a new Budget Head within the Red Book of Government's Estimates of Expenditure. This Budget Head would represent the Government's Climate Change Fund. Funding for individual projects/programmes could then be identified by sub-heads in cases where there was agreement over the further ear-marking of external funding.
3. It is recommended that this approach be adopted as soon as possible, in preference to the creation of any separate financing mechanism, such as that of a trust fund. One important consideration in focusing on the national budgetary system is that climate change will require actions that are not confined to short-term activities, where establishing a temporary trust fund might be justified. Climate finance will be an important part of the public expenses for at least the next 20 years, if not longer.
4. A separate arrangement for the provision of technical assistance to climate change programmes should be developed, again following existing national models (e.g. LGCDP, SSRP). The arrangements for implementing a pooled mechanism, possibly through the UN system, require further investigation.
5. The early creation of further new structures for climate change management brings with it certain risks (namely a diversion and dissipation of effort); there is much need to strengthen the existing structures in the short term (e.g. the MoE's role as the country's focal agency for climate change) and then to build further institutional capacity as resources permit. The policy commitment to create a climate change centre could be quickly accomplished through the re-designation of the climate change management division within the MoE, without undermining the options available for its long-term institutional setting.
6. As climate change activities start with the flow of new and additional finance, there will be a premium to keep a strategic focus on early implementation to secure lesson learning. The two national programmes supported by the Climate Investments Funds, the SPCR and SREP, will provide important early experience in the implementation of climate change

related actions and should therefore be managed in an inclusive way. The focus on involving private sector actors within both programmes is noteworthy and should be used to energise public policy engagement with the private sector at scale.

7. Wider government reforms will be important for the efficient use of climate finance, in particular the further strengthening of the country's public financial management system. Comprehensive implementation of the 2007 Public Procurement Act would increase confidence in public expenditure controls. The strategic, multi-year allocation of resources to climate change actions through the Medium Term Expenditure Framework is another area of PFM reform that warrants attention.
8. The possibility of tracking climate change public expenditure within the national budget should be explored with the MoF. This should build on the existing examples of gender and pro-poor budget tracking within the national budget, as well as the Ministry's aid information management system. A system should be designed that addresses the issue of identifying the incremental cost of making sector programmes 'climate resilient' across all sectors of the economy, as well as tracking climate expenditure flows to the local level. It should avoid solely taking a projectised approach to the tagging of climate-related expenditure. In the first instance, a design workshop (involving financial statisticians, economists and climate specialists) should be held to address the design issues of tracking climate finance.
9. The Government should create a public website to act as the national information hub on all climate change actions (and be

linked to financial information at the MoF). This should not require significant investment, but government should give some priority to making such information available and not to rely on projectised activity. The SPCR website (<http://www.ppcrnepal.gov.np/>) is a good example of the limitations of depending on project activity; since the ending of the design phase of the SPCR the website appears not to be maintained.

10. Finally, an early effort should be made to identify and record all international support for climate change actions undertaken within the country by NGOs. The MCCICC may be the appropriate forum to champion such an exercise due to its national coordination function. This information should be placed in the public domain using a web-based information portal. Civil society has an obligation to demonstrate high standards of transparency and accountability for the financial resources that it manages.

#### **4.2 Recommendations for actions over the medium term**

11. In addition to these immediate actions, which could be instigated over the next six to twelve months, there are two fundamental reforms that will likely take more time to address.
12. First, it will be most important to secure the right structures at the local level to ensure that the flow of climate finance reaches the most vulnerable communities. This will require the creation of capacity within existing district level structures. Lessons learned from the LGCDP can be drawn upon to develop mechanisms to improve local institutional capacity and accountability to implement climate change programmes. A mapping of VDC,

Municipalities and DDC functions, powers, capacities and relationships would be a good starting point to identify potential local actors that could take lead roles in managing the finance and development of climate change programmes at the local level.

13. Second, further thought is needed on how best to channel on funding for climate change to all parts of the economy. An important point of principle is that such funding should pass through the national budget and be made available to all sectors for climate-related work programmes through the annual bidding round of the

annual budget. A role for the MoE/CCC would be to provide the technical support to both central ministries as well as LBs to ensure that the financing bids submitted reflect the incremental costs of operating service provision in a changing climate. This reform programme will require close collaboration between MoE and MoF and represents a major undertaking for the effective and efficient delivery of climate finance.

14. All of these issues now require further investigation and development to arrive at the most appropriate architecture for climate finance in Nepal.



## Annex 1. People met

| Name                      | Position  | Organisation                        |
|---------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|
| Dinesh Devkota            | Member  | National Planning Commission        |
| Lal Shanker Ghimire       | Joint Secretary   | Ministry of Finance                 |
| Bhuban Karki              | Under Secretary   | Ministry of Finance                 |
| Gopi Khanal               | Under Secretary   | Ministry of Local Development       |
| Binod Prakash Singh       | Under Secretary   | Ministry of Local Development       |
| Krishna Gyawali           | Secretary   | Ministry of Environment             |
| Ganesh Raj Joshi          | Secretary   | Ministry of Environment             |
| Batu Krishna Uprety       | Joint Secretary   | Ministry of Environment             |
| Purushottam Ghimere       | Joint Secretary   | Ministry of Environment             |
| Lekha Nath Poudel         | Under Secretary   | Ministry of Education               |
| Narayan Prasad Chaulagain | Executive Director  | AEPC                                |
| Rabj Babu Shrestha        | Executive Director  | Poverty Alleviation Fund            |
| Avishesh Neupane          | Environmental Officer   | Poverty Alleviation Fund            |
| Robert Piper              | UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator                              | UN                                  |
| Jorn Sorensen             | Deputy Country Director (Programme)                                   | UNDP                                |
| Vijaya Singh              | Assistant Country Director, Environment, Energy & Climate Change Unit | UNDP                                |
| Julien Chevillard         | Facilitator for aid management and coordination                       | UNDP                                |
| Brian Harding             | Climate Change specialist   | UNDP                                |
| Neil Webster              | Decentralisation and Local Governance Adviser                         | UNDP                                |
| Jenty Kirsch-Wood         | Head, Disaster Risk Management Unit                                   | UNDP                                |
| Anne-Sophie Le Beux       | Programme specialist  | UN Peace Fund for Nepal             |
| Shahid Parwez             | Programs Implementation Officer                                       | Asian Development Bank              |
| Anil Pokhrel              | Climate Change Adviser  | Asian Development Bank              |
| Cindy Malvicini           | Senior Water Resources Specialist                                     | Asian Development Bank, Manila      |
| Claudia Sadoff            | Lead Economist  | World Bank                          |
| Stephanie Borsboom        | Operations Officer  | World Bank                          |
| Simon Lucas               | Climate change & inclusive growth adviser                             | DFID                                |
| William Paterson          | Director, General Development Office                                  | USAID                               |
| Kishore KC                | Program Specialist  | USAID                               |
| Netra Sharma              | NR Governance and Climate Change                                      | USAID                               |
| IngeHaraldVognild         | First Secretary   | Royal Nowegian Embassy              |
| Shiva Sharma Paudyal      | Senior Programme Officer  | Embassy of Denmark                  |
| Ram Chandra Khanal        | Natural Resource Management Specialist                                | Independent consultant              |
| BhushanTuladhar           | Network Coordinator   | Climate Change Network Nepal (CCNN) |

## **Annex 2. Lesson learning from six development initiatives**

- A. The Local Governance and Community Development Programme
- B. The Poverty Alleviation Fund
- C. The Nepal Peace Funds
- D. The School Sector Reform Programme
- E. The Alternative Energy Promotion Centre
- F. Nepal Disaster Risk Reduction Consortium

## A. The Local Governance and Community Development Programme

### Informants:

Gopi Khanal, Programme Manager, LGCDP and Under Secretary, MLD  
 Binod Singh, Under Secretary, MLD  
 Neil Webster, Decentralisation & Local Governance Adviser, UNDP

### Documents reviewed:

- 2008 Programme memorandum
- 2009 Joint financing arrangement
- 2010 Mid-term review report

**Website:** <http://www.lgcdp.gov.np/home/index.php>

**Start/End Dates for LGCDP Programme:** 16 July 2008 – 15 July 2012

**Total original estimated budget:** USD 463 million (four year total)

**Government budget:** USD 261 million (62%)

**Development Partner contribution:** USD 161 million

### 1. Description of programme

The objective of the Local Governance and Community Development Programme (LGCDP) is to contribute towards poverty reduction through inclusive, responsive, and accountable local governance and participatory community-led development. Its design combines performance-based grants with capacity development. The LGCDP has been widely recognised as being a timely response to the post-conflict situation in Nepal, and has brought Development Partners together in a programmatic way, in a sector where previous donor support had been very fragmented (Ferrazzi et al., 2011). The underlying intention of the LGCDP is ‘to move the local governance and community development sector towards a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) for decentralisation’ (Programme Document, 2008). This issue was further explored in a Scott-Wilson study. The project covers all the country’s 75 District

Development Committees, 58 Municipalities and 3,915 Village Development Committees.

Key features of sector-wide management, to be developed and introduced during LGCDP, are:

- a) The provision of a single, clear sector policy and strategic framework that links the sector policies with the LGCDP (including the expenditure plans for the sector), so that the allocation of programme resources reflects the priorities for the sector.
- b) An annual programme and budget which specify the activities to be carried out under each strategic objective and by department/divisions/local bodies.
- c) Reporting on activities and performance indicators against the plan, with common reporting and performance monitoring

arrangements (rather than each funding and supporting agency having its own review process and missions). (Programme Document, 2008).

One challenge for Programme implementation identified by the mid-term review concerns fiduciary risk management: 'The use of program funds is difficult to ascertain with precision and reliability due to the financial planning and reporting weaknesses in LGCDP. Financial reports are late, incomplete and do not sufficiently discuss variance. Reporting against program outputs and outcomes is particularly weak. These weaknesses aggravate fiduciary risk and deny management a clear picture to help in steering the program.'(Ferrazzi et al., 2011). LGCDP has since strengthened its fiduciary risk mitigation approach, with additional measures by government and new initiatives introduced by the DPs supporting LGCDP.

The overall program was originally estimated to cost USD 466 million, with the Nepal government budget being USD 261 million (Programme Document, 2008). However, the government budget for the performance-based block grants has risen significantly since the original programme document. It is now estimated that the overall 4-year programme expenditure may be as high as USD 850 million (unverified). External funding support is provided by a broad range of development partners:

- Asian Development Bank (ADB)
- Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)
- Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
- Department for International Development (DFID)
- United Nations System (UNDP,

UNICEF, UNCDF, UNFPA, UNV)

- Government of Norway
- Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
- The German Technical Cooperation (GIZ)
- Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
- World Bank (WB)
- USAID

The LGCDP support for local community development parallels the objectives of the Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF). However, these two initiatives have quite different approaches. The LGCDP works through the government system at all levels, whilst the PAF is a centrally determined initiative that makes greater use of NGO and private sector service providers. At the national level it is planned to have a coordination committee to review the coordination and linkages between PAF and the LGCDP, although this has yet to meet.

## **2. Management experience against the Paris Declaration Principles**

### **National ownership**

The LGCDP is managed by the Ministry of Local Development (MLD). The MLD holds two functions: (i) local governance support to Local Bodies (LBs) through grant disbursement and (ii) support for local infrastructure. It is not a line ministry as such. A National Advisory Committee (NAC) oversees the strategic implementation of the LGCDP, meeting twice a year. A programme coordination unit within the MLD is responsible for delivering the outputs of the LGCDP.

The programmes and budget of the LGCDP are incorporated into the annual budget of GoN. There was a history of many scattered

projects supporting local community development and the LGCDP was the first attempt to consolidate disparate projects within a single budgeting system under single reporting. Fifteen Development Partners (DPs) currently support LGCDP, under three types of funding arrangement:

- Six DPs (ADB, DFID, CIDA, DANIDA, Norway and SDC) support a Joint Funding Arrangement (JFA), where funding is channelled through a foreign currency account into the government treasury system: effectively an ear-marked donor basket-fund. (This arrangement covers approximately 80 percent of DP funding support).
- Six UN agencies provide technical support, together with some programme support, under a separate UN Joint Agreement. (This arrangement covers approximately 20 percent of DP support).
- Bilateral aligned support is provided by JICA, GIZ, USAID and the World Bank (Unknown spend).

The LGCDP is thus a semi-SWAp approach, with six DPs contributing to an earmarked basket fund. There are plans to consider a move to a full SWAp. The Programme is fully aligned with the Three Year Indicative Plan, the MTEF and Annual Budget (where the LGCDP is recognised as a high priority programme, 'P1'). Hence at both planning and budgeting levels national ownership over the programme can be demonstrated.

## **Funding flows**

The DPs supporting the JFA make funds available to the government through a foreign exchange account in the name of the Ministry of Finance at the Nepal Rastra Bank, to be used exclusively to finance the Programme. Government funding, as well as donor agencies' resources from the foreign exchange account, are released to District Development Funds and Municipal Development Funds. The District Development Committee then facilitates the release of funds to Village Development Funds and/or Community Development Funds or CBOs and then to the communities.

## **Alignment of donors**

LGCDP fully uses government systems. There is no separate project implement unit staffed by contract staff. The programme coordination unit is made up of civil servants from the MLD, supported by donor-funded specialists at the central and district levels. The programme is well aligned with government systems. However, there are two issues raised by DPs: (i) continuing concern over fiduciary risk; and (ii) downwards accountability.

## **Harmonisation by donors**

DPs have a harmonised approach within the programme through the Programme JFA and the UN Joint Agreement (which is the only one in Nepal). Joint donor focal group meetings take place monthly.

### **Management for results**

A results-based framework is at an early stage of development. Traditionally much emphasis has been placed on input indicators. The programme fourth strategic implementation plan (for 2011/12) has now added output indicators for each part of the programme.

### **Mutual accountability**

The Programme JFA specifies the commitments by both the government and development partners with regard to joint meetings, performance and financial reporting, and audits.

## **3. Management experience against climate finance fiduciary standards**

### **Financial integrity**

The transfer of funds is linked to the submission of financial as well as physical output reports. In the absence of reports from Local Bodies (LBs) no further transfers should take place until all problems have been resolved. The block grants have both minimum and performance-related standards, including indicators related to financial management.

There are known weakness at VDC level, where expenditure recording is poor. The Programme therefore provides support for

strengthening LB audits and capacity building, including support for the development of new audit guidelines for LBs. The MLD has established a LB Fiscal Commission as a semi-autonomous body to strengthen the capacity of local audit assessors (recognising four categories of assessor).

### **Institutional Capacity**

Local Bodies (LBs) will have to operate any reformed system of local government, which will make considerable demands on existing limited capacity. Although the present situation differs in different districts, widespread improvements will take time to come into effect.

### **Transparency and self-investigative powers**

There are some problems concerning the implementation of the block grant system in some areas at some times. There are big delays at the village secretary level and local parties are not fully accountable. On generic problem is the rush to spend money at the end of each financial year. Much depends on there being a general level of awareness by local people. There is need to make the participatory system stronger, through the further development of social audits. The programme has introduced a local governance accountability facility, with earmarked funds to provide resources for civil society to monitor local level public expenditure.

## B. The Poverty Alleviation Fund

### Informants:

Raj Babu Shrestha, Executive Director, PAF

Avishesh Neupane, Environmental Officer, PAF

### Documents reviewed:

- 2007 World Bank Project Appraisal Document
- 2010 Project Implementation Status report
- 2011 World Bank Project Paper for proposed additional funding

**Website:** <http://www.pafnepal.org.np/>

**Start/End Dates for PAF:** 2002 – 30 June 2014 (second phase)

**Total estimated budget (2010/11):** USD 41.5 million

**Government budget:** USD 4.3 million (10%)

**Development Partner contribution:** USD 37.2 million

### 1. Description of programme

The Poverty Alleviation Fund Nepal (PAF, Nepal) was established in 2002 under the PAF Ordinance, 2002, and subsequently the PAF Act, 2006, as an autonomous institution. It works alongside local level government and community organizations to co-finance investments in local infrastructure, services, livelihoods activities and social mobilization for the benefit of the most excluded people in Nepalese society. The PAF began in a small set of pilot districts and has subsequently expanded to 40 districts nationwide. There are plans to cover all of the country's 75 districts.

Overall project management responsibility lies with the PAF Board, chaired by the Prime Minister, which meets every two months. The PAF is a small organisation made up of staff recruited on fixed term contracts on a competitive basis. In addition there are a number of consultants and/or NGOs who are retained to support operations as needed. Under recent scaling-up, additional

Portfolio Managers have been hired. A review of staffing needs and recruitment of additional staff in administration, finance and monitoring is underway, and a PAF Human Resource Strategy is being prepared. Overall operating costs of the PAF Secretariat will be maintained at 4 percent of the total cost of the programme. As PAF is becoming a major government instrument for poverty reduction, the Government has begun mainstreaming its support by meeting up to 20 percent of the operating costs of PAF as counterpart financing.

The PAF support for local community development parallels the objectives of the Local Governance and Community Development Programme (LGCDP). However, these two initiatives have quite different approaches. The LGCDP works through the government system under the Ministry of Local Development, whilst the PAF is an autonomous entity. At the national level there are plans to have a coordination committee to review the coordination and linkages between PAF and the LGCDP.

## **2. Management experience against the Paris Declaration Principles**

### **National ownership**

The PAF directly supports the social inclusion programme of the government's Three Year Interim Plan. In view of the expansion of its programme, PAF has prepared its own Long Term Vision Plan, covering 2007-2025.

PAF's approved budget is indicated in the public sector Estimates of Expenditures (Red Book) under a separate budget heading in the Prime Minister and Council of Minister's Office, and can therefore be considered 'on-budget'. The two external sources of funding (IDA and IFAD) pass through a designated foreign exchange Account for PAF.

### **Funding flows**

Community groups, with assistance from PAF partner organisations (DDCs, VDCs, Municipalities, private firms and NGOs) submit project proposals to the national PAF secretariat for funding. Upon approval, PAF disburses funds for the sub-project to bank accounts in the name of the selected community group. Community groups choose among themselves those responsible for managing the bank account. Disbursements to the community group accounts are made in one tranche. Communities are able to access funds from their bank accounts in two tranches, with the second tranche released once agreed milestones as described in the sub-project proposal are met.

### **Alignment of donors**

The PAF is not fully aligned with government systems but runs a complementary system that is community-based and demand-

driven. Planning takes place at the district level and adopts a targeted approach for those areas where government has yet to reach.

### **Harmonisation by donors**

The PAF is supported by two Development Partners, the World Bank (IDA) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).

### **Management for results**

The PAF Secretariat produces a results matrix each year, which is subject to review. The matrix consists of mostly output and some outcome indicators. Impact evaluation studies have also been undertaken, based on earlier baseline studies. Two such studies have been completed. They have demonstrated mixed results with regard to the impact of project activity on local poverty levels, but generally indicate a positive direction. Consumption levels have increased in households that have received benefits from PAF. Some positive social changes have also been observed (children going to school, women's empowerment); other social dimensions are not yet advanced.

### **Mutual accountability**

In 2008 a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed with the MLD to agree that PAF projects appear in the district development plans; a revised, more detailed MoU was agreed in 2010, with LGCDP collaborating in the planning process. Based on this positive experience, the PAF Secretariat is developing other MoUs with AEPC, WFP, USAID and GIZ to coordinate project activity.



### 3. Management experience against climate finance fiduciary standards

#### Financial integrity

The overall fiduciary risk associated with the project was rated as 'modest' for financial management by the World Bank, and a risk mitigation action plan has been put into effect. The PAF has placed significant emphasis on capacity building in project coordination and implementation, including financial management.

The PAF maintains a Management Information System (MIS), providing an important source of information for management decisions and for the assessment of progress. This MIS system produces data on administrative processes, fiscal flows, and targeting and programme performance. Data are entered by individual Portfolio Managers upon their return from the field and this information is accessible from staff terminals. All staff have direct access to these data from their computers and can see the performance of their organization in real time.

PAF's monitoring data is developed on five different databases which record data at the level of partner and community organizations and monitoring of sub-project activities. These databases provide a rich source of information on PAF activities and are analyzed to improve planning and address weaknesses in the project implementation process and to identify areas of strength that can be scaled up. Various aspects of these data are accessible through the MIS which synthesizes data to monitor and report on the key monitoring indicators of the project.

#### Institutional Capacity

A Governance and Accountability Action Plan (GAAP) has been developed, which identifies

corporate governance, coordination and cooperation between the PAF and key government agencies including OPMCM, MoF, NPC, MLD as among key areas for increased governance and accountability. The PAF GAAP proposes actions for each of the identified issues, a time line for each action, and the responsible agency for implementation. In addition, the PAF website ([www.pafnepal.org](http://www.pafnepal.org)) posts procurement details of the project and updates on project activities including trimester Implementation Progress Reports (IPRs), Annual Audit Reports and partner organization evaluations.

Looking to the different procurement needs, the following provisions have been made under the project:

- PAF has a trained procurement officer conversant with IDA's procurement procedures, especially those related to small community-based investments.
- Standardized technical details for the community sub-projects have been prepared to be used as an aid to preparation and review of sub-project proposals.
- Given that the formation of groups of beneficiaries and hiring of partner organisations is a continuous process spread over the entire project period, workshops and seminars on procurement issues are organized at regular intervals to ensure good understanding of procurement procedures amongst PAF staff and partner organisations.
- A sample review of community procurement is carried out once every two years utilizing the services of an independent consultant.

### **Transparency and self-investigative powers**

The PAF management information system is connected to the internet through the website, and some project specific data are available to the general public. Disbursement information is updated periodically, and can be queried by any member of the general public through the PAF website. Grievance recording has improved with the inclusion of a simple form added to the PAF website. Data from this source generates a periodic grievance report for action by PAF management. Written complaints are received at the PAF office or directed to them via other Government Offices.

The risk of mismanagement is mitigated by the fact that (a) PAF is managed at the national level by an independent and credible Board which includes beneficiary representation; (b) its operations are governed by Operational and Financial Management System manuals which provide simple, clear guidelines for all stages of community mobilization and sub-project selection and implementation, and these manuals are widely disseminated; (c) the project has a strong MIS, and the data it generates is widely disseminated, which facilitates social auditing of PAF activities, and (d) arrangements are in place for both internal and external financial auditing.

## C. The Nepal Peace Funds

### Informant:

Anne Sophie Le Beux, UN

### Documents reviewed:

- 2011 UN Peace Fund for Nepal fact sheet
- 2010 Ninth Progress Report of the Nepal Peace Trust Fund
- 2010 Third Annual Progress Report of the UN Peace Fund Nepal (draft)

**Websites:** <http://www.nptf.gov.np/>

<http://mdtf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/npf00>

**Start/End Dates for NPTF** : February 2007 – January 2013

**Start/End Dates for UNPFN:** March 2007 – unspecified end date

|  | NPTF            | UNPFN<br>As of Dec 2010 |
|--|-----------------|-------------------------|
| <b>Total estimated budget:</b>           | USD 101 million | USD 32 million          |
| <b>Total expenditure:</b>                | USD 101 million | USD 19 million          |
| <b>Government budget:</b>                | USD 64 million  | USD 0                   |
| <b>Development Partner contribution:</b> | USD 35 million  | USD 32 million          |

### 1. Description of the Peace Funds

The Peace process and associated aid architecture is complex. Two trust funds are in operation: the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) and the UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN). The former was created in February 2007, the latter in March 2007.

The NPTF is a Government programme established to implement the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Accord, which was signed in November, 2006. During its first phase, between 2007 and 2010, it disbursed just over USD 100 million for peace related activities. Approximately two-thirds of funding came from government, with additional support provided by five bilateral Development Partners: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Switzerland and the UK. All of the projects financed by the Fund have been implemented by government agencies.

The United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN) was established in March 2007 to complement the Government's NPTF. The UNPFN was established to mobilize resources for activities of clear, short-term relevance to the peace process where these could not be funded or implemented through the NPTF or other existing mechanisms or programmes. The Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office (MDTF Office) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the Administrative Agent (AA) of the UNPFN. To ensure non-duplication of effort and strategic coherence in support of the peace process, the UNPFN operates within the same overall governance framework as the Government's NPTF. The UNPFN has received a total of USD 32 million, with contributions from the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, Denmark, Switzerland and the United Nations Peace building Fund (which has 45 donors). All of the projects financed by the UNPFN have been implemented by UN agencies.

In terms of overall governance structure, the Minister for Peace and Reconstruction acts as Chair of the NPTF Board, with the Minister for Finance as Co-Chair, together with the Minister for Physical Planning and Works, the Vice-Chair from the NPC and the Secretaries from the Ministries of Home Affairs, Finance, and Peace and Reconstruction. Representatives of the five largest political parties in the Constituent Assembly are also Board Members. The Board meets three times a year.


UNPFN projects are approved and the operations of the UNPFN are carried out under the overall guidance of the Government-led NPTF Board, in consultation with the Donor Advisory Group, and according to the instructions of the UNPFN Executive Committee, chaired by the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator together with

a donor representative and a Government representative from the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction.

A Donor Group (DG) [previously known as the donor advisory group (DAG)] provides advice to the Board on the operation of the two funds and is made up of DPs supporting both funds. The DG helps to avoid the emergence of gaps and duplication in funding, as well as to ensure that support to the UNPFN complements support to the NPTF and other existing funding mechanisms. Furthermore, the Government representative on the UNPFN Executive Committee is the Director of the NPTF, and plays a key coordination role between the two mechanisms.

The overall governance structure, showing the complementarity between the NPTF and the UNPFN is as follows:

**Governance structure for the Nepal Peace Fund and the UN Peace Fund for Nepal**



Source: UNPFN Third Annual Report, June 2010

## 2. Management experience against the Paris Declaration Principles

### National ownership

The Peace Fund Secretariat (PFS) is located at the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) under the leadership of the Director (Joint Secretary of the MoPR). The operations of the fund is governed by The Peace Fund (Operation) Rules, 2065 (2008) as its overarching legal document. A Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA) was developed by the Government and participating donors to the Fund in February 2007. This was amended in January 2010 and again in November 2010. Since May 2008, funding for the NPTF has gone through the treasury account.

The Multi-Donor Trust Fund office (MDTFO) of the UNDP acts as the administrative agent for the UNPFN. Its responsibilities include the receipt, administration and management of contributions from donors; disbursement of funds to participating organizations in accordance with instructions from the UNPFN Executive Committee, and consolidation of narrative and financial reports produced by each of the participating organizations, as well as the provision of these reports to the UNPFN Executive Committee for onward submission to donors.

The 2010 joint Government of Nepal and Donor review of the NPTF noted that the UNPFN's deliberate use of the same governance arrangements as the NPTF had contributed to ensuring harmonization and a coherent approach between the two funds. The review also noted that the UNPFN's mandate, its flexible and rapid approach, technical expertise, combined with its coherence with the NPTF structure, means it has had a positive, complementary role

to play. This was further underlined by the relevance of the UNPFN in areas where the Government of Nepal may not have the technical expertise or capacity, such as in demining and initiatives which are politically sensitive, including the verification of combatants.

### Funding flows for the NPTF

NPTF funds are deposited in the Central Treasury under the terms of the JFA. The Board is fully authorized to approve projects and may draw from an account in the Nepal Rastra Bank for such purposes. These funds are then disbursed to implementing agencies following normal GoN procedure, i.e. through the Financial Comptroller General's Office (FCGO) and District Treasury Controller's Office (DTCO). Any unspent balance of the NPTF is carried forward each financial year.

### Alignment of donors

Projects implemented under the UN Peace Fund are designed and carried out under the overall guidance of the Government-led NPTF Board, in consultation with the donor group (DG), and according to the instructions of the Executive Committee. The role of the DG is to help avoid the emergence of gaps and duplication in funding, as well as ensure that support to the UN Peace Fund complements support to the NPTF and other existing funding mechanisms.

### Harmonisation by donors

Seven DPs support the NPTF under one Joint Financing Agreement (Denmark, EU, Finland, Germany, Norway, Switzerland and the UK); five donors contribute to the UNPFN (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland and the UK). Four DPs are therefore contributing to both modalities.

### **Management for results**

Monitoring has been identified as the weakest part of NPTF. Greater emphasis has been called to be given to: (i) frequent monitoring visits; (ii) hiring of a third party institution for regular M&E; and (iii) the timely production and sharing of M&E reports among concerned stakeholders. A results-based framework is under development by the UNPFN. A distinction has to be made between M&E and Results Frameworks. Currently, projects are clustered within an overarching framework for M&E. This now needs to evolve into a Results Framework.

### **Mutual accountability**

The Seventh Progress Report of the Peace Fund Secretariat (PFS) in 2009 recorded the decision to carry out an Annual Joint GoN-Donor Review of the NPTF. The Ninth Progress report of the PFS reported that 'Financial and audit information are creating serious mistrust among NPTF partners. Therefore, it will benefit both GoN and donors that the PFS devises a mechanism, in consultation with FCGO, DG and other concerned, to timely track the spending incurred by government implementing agencies as well as produce advance audit statements with sufficient details to satisfy the ongoing serious concerns of the contributors to Fund.'

## **3. Management experience against climate finance fiduciary standards**

### **Financial integrity**

For the NPTF the normal government channels for audit are followed, with internal audits of project accounts carried out by the district treasury controller's office for government implemented projects. The

final audit each year for the entire NPTF is undertaken by the Office of the Auditor General.

For the UNPFN, the Administrative Agent and Participating UN Organizations are audited in accordance with their own Financial Regulations and Rules and in accordance with the Framework for Auditing Multi-Donor Trust Funds, which has been agreed to by the Internal Audit Services of Participating UN Organizations and endorsed by UNDG.

### **Institutional Capacity**

Capacity issues are complex. At the working level there is much mutual learning and progress is being made. For example, the national trust fund has borrowed systems from the UN trust fund, such as the preparation of concept notes prior to compiling the project document. GIZ is now providing technical assistance to the national trust fund.

### **Transparency and self-investigative powers**

The major vehicle for public transparency of operations under the UNPFN is the MDTF Office-maintained UNPFN website, ([www.undp.org/mdtf/nepal](http://www.undp.org/mdtf/nepal)). The website is updated regularly and provides current information on all issues related to the UNPFN. All project approvals made by the UNPFN Executive Committee, as well as additional information and progress updates on these projects are uploaded on the website. Donor pledges, commitments, and deposits are updated monthly and provide the Executive Committee, as well as all other stakeholders, up-to-date information on the financial status of the UNPFN. The national trust fund's website in comparison is less informative and appears to be up-dated on a less regular basis.

## D. The School Sector Reform Plan

### Informant:

Dr Lekha Nath Poudel, Under Secretary, Ministry of Education

### Documents reviewed:

- 2009 School sector reform plan
- 2009 SSRP JFA agreement

### Website: none

( MoE website: <http://moe.gov.np>)

### Start/End Dates for SSRP:

23 December 2009 – 15 December 2014

### Total estimated budget:

USD 3,054 million

### Government budget:

USD 2,002 million (80%)

### Development Partner contribution:

USD 624 million

### Govt. extra-budgetary resources:

USD 428 million

### 1. Description of programme

The School Sector Reform Plan (SSRP) is a 5-year programme that aims to increase access to, and improve the quality of, school education, particularly basic education and especially for children from marginalized groups.

The Ministry of Education (MoEd) has been working with international development partners (DPs) for more than three decades. During the 1980s, external support provided to MoEd was delivered through projects. This gradually evolved into a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) and is now moving towards budget support. The shift towards a SWAp in education has been gradual in its growth and the development has taken more than 18 years to reach its present stage.

Scott Wilson Nepal (2010) gave a detailed description of the change process that has taken place:

- Phase I (BPEP) (1992-97) built on project experience in the sector by expanding the programme across Nepal in 1992 with

financial support from DANIDA, World Bank, UNESCO, UNICEF and UNDP.

- Phase 2 (BPEP-2, 1999-2004) opened ways for consolidation and expansion of the SWAp in Education. The main activities during this phase were: (i) integrating the project fully in MOEd's regular system; (ii) establishing a Department of Education; (iii) developing a core program document; (iv) Joint arrangements were made for annual missions and reporting mechanisms for both pooling and non-pooling partners; (v) the alignment of funds and (vi) the provision of contact points to liaise between DPs and MoEd.
- Phase 3 (Education for All 2004-09): A more advanced form of SWAp developed, with SWAp being localized in its form and functions. A Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA) was also developed and a pooled fund created. The pooling partners of the core investment programme were ADB, AusAid, Denmark, DFID, EU, Finland, Norway, UNICEF and the World Bank. Non-pooling partners included JICA, WFP

and UNESCO. A Code of conduct and clear TORs were developed for all partners, including the government agencies.

- Phase 4 School Sector Reform plan (SSRP-2009-2015): the scope of SWAp widened during this phase from primary to secondary education. Nine development partners joined the pool and eight agencies remain as non-pooling partners.

The Joint Appraisal Document, the JFA, and the Governance and Accountability Action Plan are key documents that have contributed to the overarching framework for the SSRP SWAp. The Code of Conduct provides SSRP partners, including the Government, with a cohesive framework for aid effectiveness and creates a climate to work in good faith in line with the principles of Paris Declaration. Advanced School Improvement Plans offer an opportunity for the SWAp to reinforce bottom-up planning processes and have strengthened alignment, harmonization and integration of resources in the education sector.

## **2. Management experience against the Paris Declaration Principles**

### **National Ownership**

National ownership is strongly demonstrated, with the SSRP consistent with the Education for all National Plan of Action, 2001-2015. The Ministry of Education is the lead agency, facilitated through the Department of Education and implemented through a decentralised structure (including the VDCs and Municipalities). MoEd ensures that sufficient funds are allocated in the government's resource plan for education and that district allocations are equitable.

### **Funding flows**

The SSRP's financial management is in line with current government financial procedures. The financial management system in Nepal comprises six stages: (a) the budget is approved by the Parliament; (b) the Ministry of Finance authorises the Secretary for Ministry of Education; (c) the Secretary sends authority to implementing agencies; (d) the implementing agencies send authority to the different cost centres; (e) the Financial Controller General's Office (FCGO) at the centre and its district level offices release funds to the cost centres and carry out internal audits; and finally, (f) the Auditor General's Office, a constitutional body, conducts the final audit each year.

Development partners are expected to provide sector budget support grants channelled through the JFA. Budget support from development partners is envisaged through predictable bilateral agreements committed to Government's Estimates of Expenditure ('the Red Book'). The average share of external funding in the total SSRP financing is approximately 24 percent. Nine DPs contribute to the pooled funding arrangement under the JFA: ADB, AusAid, Denmark, European Union, DFID, Finland, Norway, UNICEF and World Bank. Non-pooling partners for the SSRP are Japan, WFP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNDP, INGOs and USAID.

### **Alignment of donors**

The JFA and CoCare two instruments that have helped to increase the alignment of DP support with government policies, programmes and implementation arrangements. The 2009 School Sector Reform Plan stated: 'The Joint Financing



Arrangement of 2004 is an example of the evolving *'partnership spirit'* that has led to an increase in the share of budget channelled through the Government system and for which national procedures are the basis for planning, budgeting, monitoring and reporting. This type of 'basket' funding represents a desirable programmatic funding approach that has significantly reduced the Ministry's transaction costs and has provided a foundation for further improvement in the way aid is managed in the education sector.' This clearly demonstrates that much DP support is now well aligned with national systems.

The MoEd have highlighted the following aspects of SSRP as strengthening the alignment process:

- The Ministry's policy of 'One-Door-Only' for DP interaction, with all DP interaction channeled through the Foreign Aid Coordination Sections of the MoEd
- SSRP is used as the basis for scrutinizing all aid proposals
- The SSRP LogFrame is used as the basic management tool
- There is one Joint Steering Committee to oversee and provide management oversight for all Direct Funding and Technical Assistance that is not part of GoN's Red Book
- A DF Secretariat assists in administration to reduce the administrative burden elsewhere.

### **Harmonisation by donors**

The MoEd acknowledges the improved harmonisation by DPs brought about by the Paris Declaration. The JFA and CoC are employed to ensure that DPs are well harmonised in their efforts to support the education sector and that these are used to promote common arrangements and procedures.

### **Management for results**

Financial, management, and technical matters for service management and service delivery at all levels are tracked and monitored. MoEd coordinates the M&E functions at the central level. At the district and local level, District Education Officers and schools are responsible for the M&E functions along with the local government. The M&E utilises key indicators and a result framework to monitor and evaluate programme interventions made under the SSRP.

### **Mutual accountability**

A Joint Steering Committee comprising heads of the central level agencies and donor contact points undertakes planning, management, monitoring and reporting of direct funding facilities and TA. This committee ensures alignment with the Ministry's own planning processes, thereby reducing administrative costs, and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of direct funding and TA provisions.

The JFA intentionally reduced the number of consultations with DPs to one annual review and one annual consultation. This high level annual review addresses issues at overall policy and outcome levels. It focuses mainly on results reported from the agreed indicators in the monitoring system of SSRP. The main objective of the annual consultation is to assess progress and the achievements of the joint agreement and agree the financial requirement for the coming fiscal year.

### **3. Management experience against climate finance fiduciary standards**

#### **Financial integrity**

Implementation of the programme was interrupted in 2010, when DP disbursements were suspended due to fiduciary issues related to SSRP operation. Late submission of financial monitoring reports (FMRs) further compounded the situation. The Government responded to these concerns and there was a change in the Minister for Education. Subsequently, the pooled development

partners informed the GoN that based on progress made in addressing the fiduciary concerns and the submission of FMRs, they were ready to reimburse expenditures incurred in the previous fiscal year.

#### **Institutional Capacity**

The 2009 sector reform plan stated: 'The [SSRP] programme aims to promote sustainability by operating within the framework of the Government's regular planning and reporting cycle, policies and structures, and by explicitly aiming to strengthen the institutional capacity at all levels of the Government.' This is clearly a long-term goal, as evidenced by the Ministry's efforts over the last 20 years.

#### **Transparency and self-investigative powers**

The mandatory provisions of social audit in schools and communities will be reinforced under the SSRP to improve transparency and accountability.

## E. The Alternative Energy Promotion Centre

### Informant:

Dr Narayan Chaulagain, Executive Director, AEPC

### Documents reviewed:

- 2010 Feasibility study on the possibility of the sector wide approach (SWAp) in the rural and renewable energy sector
- 2011 Joint review of energy sector assistance programme Nepal - draft
- 2011 AEPC Strategic organization development plan. Volume 1

**Website:** <http://www.aepc.gov.np/>

**Start Date for AEPC:** 3 November 1996

|                                       |                |                       |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Total estimated annual budget:</b> | USD 27 million | 2 billion NPR         |
| <b>Government budget:</b>             | USD 5 million  | (19%) 400 million NPR |
| <b>Development Partners budget:</b>   | USD 22 million | 1,600 million NPR     |

### 1. Description of the Alternative Energy Promotion Centre

AEPC was established in 1996 (under the Development Board Act of 1956) to promote the use of alternative/renewable energy technologies to meet the energy needs of Nepal. This semi-autonomous Centre has a small permanent staff and is governed by a nine member Board. The Minister of Environment chairs the Board with representatives from government ministries, industry and NGOs. AEPC provides direct financial and technical support for rural energy systems and facilitates credit and subsidy arrangements through financing institutions and the Rural Energy Fund (REF). The REF, which is managed through project assistance, subsidises micro-hydro, solar energy and other rural electrification initiatives.

AEPC is at a key stage in its institutional development, with a planned new AEPC Act that is aimed at securing its autonomous position (similar to the PAF). An initiative under the planned institutional reform programme is the creation of a national trust fund, the Central Renewable Energy Fund, which would be governed by its own Board. There is the expectation that the AEPC will benefit from international climate finance, as new funding for clean energy and energy efficiency becomes available. (Nepal is one of six pilot countries for the Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program for Low Income Countries, SREP, administered by the World Bank).

AEPC has supported Local Bodies to establish the district energy and environment sections/units, although it does not have direct vertical downward linkages with district and local institutions.

## 2. AEPC management experience against the Paris Declaration Principles

### National ownership

A Rural Energy Policy, which was finalized by AEPC, was approved by Government in 2006. The preparation of a 20-year Perspective Plan for Renewable Energy (RE) is also underway. This plan is being coordinated by the Secretary of the MoE to map out the national vision. Policy and planning therefore appear well advanced.

With regard to budgeting, the GoN's contribution in FY 2007–08 was about 17 percent of AEPC's total budget, implying very considerable dependence on international funding agencies. Since then, this level of contribution has continued and it is expected to remain the case for the foreseeable future, with between 15–20 percent of AEPC activities funded by government. With such a heavy reliance on external funding, the alignment and harmonisation of development partner (DP) actions are high priorities for the AEPC. The possibility of moving towards a SWAp for the rural energy sector is being explored at present to help address these issues.

### Funding flows

All DP support to the AEPC is provided through stand-alone projects, which raises challenges for financial oversight. The two major AEPC projects are both very longstanding initiatives: (i) the Rural Energy Development Program (supported by UNDP and World Bank), which began in the same year as the AEPC was created in 1996; and (ii) the Energy Sector Assistance Program (ESAP) since 1999. A Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA) is in operation for ESAP, with donor contributions channelled through a foreign exchange account at the central bank.

The projectised nature of DP support to the AEPC means that individual financial arrangements apply for all other projects implemented at the Centre. Each project has an account in the name of the project at commercial banks, into which donors make deposits. Withdrawals from these accounts are then made by the individual project managers. However, this funding is deemed to be 'on-budget', as it is recorded in the Government 'Red Book'.

### Major projects of AEPC

| Project                                 | Major Support Areas   | Donors   |
|---|---|--|
| Energy Sector Assistance Program (ESAP) | Micro/mini-hydro, solar energy, biomass energy, institutional support | Danida, Norway, Germany (KfW), DFID, under JFA arrangement |
| Rural Energy Development Program (REDP) | Micro/mini-hydro, community mobilization, environment, and sanitation | UNDP, World Bank   |
| Renewable Energy Project (REP)          | Community/institutional solar energy systems                          | European Commission  |
| Biogas Support Program (BSP)            | Biogas  | DGIS-SNV, KfW  |
| Improved Water Mill Support Program     | Improved water mills  | DGIS-SNV   |

The AEPC has received support from the following Development Partners:

- The World Bank
- UNDP
- DANIDA
- Norway
- Germany (KfW)
- European Commission
- The Netherlands
- UK (DFID)

#### **Alignment of donors**

A Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA) was signed by the Governments of Nepal, Denmark and Norway on 15th March 2007 and subsequently by KfW and DFID in 2010 for the Energy Sector Assistance Program. In the JFA the DPs committed themselves to the principles of harmonisation and ‘to strive for the highest degree of alignment with the budgetary and accountability system and legislation of the Government of Nepal so as to enhance effective implementation, reduce the administrative burden of the Government of Nepal and minimise transaction costs’ (clause 4).

#### **Harmonisation by donors**

AEPC’s position as the focal point for the promotion of RE in Nepal provides excellent potential for donor harmonization and alignment. The first DP coordination meeting on rural electrification was held in December 2008 and included 19 representatives from the international community, reflecting a desire to work together in a harmonised way.

However, at the project level harmonisation does not appear to be well advanced. The 2010 Scott Wilson report noted: ‘The programmes within AEPC are still doing the same thing - despite some progress in

convergence- and with different modalities in almost similar context. Interestingly, programme designs still do not adequately reflect on the experience of partner programmes. As a result, both ESAP and REDP are implementing solar and micro-hydro as separate programmes within the same umbrella organization of AEPC. This naturally incurs higher transaction costs. Similarly, payment modalities could be converged as ESAP and REDP have different modalities to make their payments.’ (page 47).

#### **Management for results**

Currently monitoring and evaluation is project based; there is a recognised need to move to a programmatic approach that will operate across the AEPC and to move towards outcomes indicators of success.

#### **Mutual accountability**

Almost all project activity is now recorded on-budget, so that government is aware of the expenditure levels of external support. The ESAP JFA provides a framework for the mutual accountability of government and a group of donors; elsewhere individual project agreements define respective responsibilities.

### **3. AEPC management experience against climate finance fiduciary standards**

#### **Financial integrity**

There have been reported widespread difficulties with the REF, associated with the delay in obtaining reimbursements on a timely basis, due to inadequate communication and connectivity (in terms of lack of road access, electricity and office automation/technology). This has led to delays in getting expenditure reports from

the more remote districts. However, the REF is double audited by both DPs and government to ensure financial integrity of the fund, and over its four-year history 1.9 billion NPR (USD 26 million) has passed through this fund.

### **Institutional capacity**

The AEPC has to follow the national system of government expenditure controls for its budget expenditure. A new set of procurement laws has been enacted and put into effect, which has incorporated the best global practices in the field, including on developing standard bidding documents. These new rules have also benefited from DPs sharing their inputs. Now the issue is to ensure effective implementation. A high-level body under the Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers (OPMCM) has recently been established to coordinate such action across the government administration.

### **Transparency and self-investigative powers**

The establishment of a rational, national RE-subsidy and its efficient implementation through the Rural Energy Fund is recognized as one of the success stories of AEPC (Norad, 2011). The subsidy modality has a number of positive features, one of which is transparency. Subsidies to individual household technologies are given as a fixed payment per system irrespective of size. This high level of transparency in REF administration has now been formalised through ISO Certification.

Misappropriation of funds within the government administration is a general concern among DPs. This led Danida to introduce complex bureaucratic control procedures in the administration of its project funds provided to AEPC. As a consequence, ESAP has been managed 'more as a project rather than as a support programme' (Norad, 2011).

## F. The Nepal Disaster Risk Reduction Consortium

### Informant:

Jenty Kirsch-Wood, Head, DRR management unit, UNDP

### Documents reviewed:

- 2011 Disaster Risk Reduction in Nepal – Flagship Programmes
- 2011 Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium: April Progress Update
- 2011 Disaster Risk Reduction in Nepal – Background Brief

**Website:** <http://www.un.org.np/nrrc>

**Start Date for DRR Programme:** May 2009

**Total estimated budget:** USD 147 million (for 5 flagship programmes)

**Government budget:** USD million (unknown)

**Development partner contribution:** USD 22 million

### 1. Description of Nepal Disaster Risk Reduction Consortium

In May 2009, the Government of Nepal launched the Nepal Disaster Risk Reduction Consortium (NDRRC), building on the national strategy for disaster risk management. The founding members of the NDRRC were the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) and the World Bank. An important operating principle of the NDRRC is that participating organizations remain autonomous in implementing programme activities, but agree to contribute to a prioritized common set of disaster risk reduction (DRR) actions.

Based on Government priorities and discussions with multi-stakeholder groups,

the Consortium members and government identified five flagship areas of immediate action for disaster risk management in Nepal:

**Flagship 1:** Improved school and hospital safety: structural and non-structural aspects of making schools and hospitals earthquake resilient through retrofitting, training and awareness raising.

**Flagship 2:** Enhanced emergency preparedness and response capacity: this flagship seeks to enhance the Government of Nepal's response capabilities at the national, regional, and district level.

**Flagship 3:** Strengthened flood management in the Koshi river basin: as the biggest river basin in Nepal, flooding in the Koshi severely impacts communities in Nepal as well as across the border in Bihar, India. This programme focuses on developing a design strategy that includes both structural and non-structural components aimed towards comprehensive disaster management.

**Flagship 4:** Integrated community based disaster risk reduction/management: this seeks to capitalize on the community based disaster risk management (CBDRM) activities and experience that has already accumulated to create a more consistent, systematic and harmonized approach to CBDRM to be conducted at the VDC level.

**Flagship 5:** Policy/Institutional support for disaster risk management.

The following table illustrates the coordination and funding position for each of the five flagship programmes:

| No | Flagship Programmes   | Coordinator | Amount (\$million) | Committed (\$million) | Gap (\$million) |
|----|---|-------------|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|
| 1  | School and hospital safety-structural and non-structural aspects of making schools and hospitals earthquake resilient | AsDB (WHO)  | 50.8               | 5.7                   | 45.1            |
| 2  | Emergency preparedness and response capacity  | OCHA        | 28                 | 5.7                   | 22.3            |
| 3  | Flood management in the Koshi River basin   | World Bank  | 24.2               | 2                     | 22.2            |
| 4  | Integrated community based Disaster Risk Reduction/management   | IFRC        | 30                 | 2.4                   | 27.6            |
| 5  | Policy/institutional support for disaster risk management (DRM)   | UNDP        | 13.8               | 5.9                   | 7.9             |
|    | Total   |             | 146.8              | 21.7                  | 125.1           |

**Source:** Disaster Risk Reduction in Nepal – Flagship Programmes, 2011

## 2. Management experience against the Paris Declaration Principles

### National Ownership

The Government formally established the NDRRC Steering Committee on 19 March 2010. The committee is chaired by the Secretary from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). Members include the Joint Secretaries of the Ministries of Finance, Education, Irrigation, Local Development, Physical Planning, Health and Population, and the National Planning Commission. Directors and Representatives of the ADB, WB, UNDP, OCHA, IFRC, NRCS, and DP-Net are also members. A Secretariat

has also been created to support the work of the Steering Committee and is comprised of the Joint-Secretary and Under-Secretary of MoHA. A NRRC Coordinator was originally financed by ISDR, UNDP and the WB and these costs has now been taken up by DFID.

The Ministry of Education has started to include DRR as a separate activity in its annual budget for 2010/2011. A National Emergency Operations Centre has also been opened by the Ministry of Home Affairs in December 2010; and Ministries, departments and agencies have allocated Disaster Risk Management Focal Points, with the majority having received basic orientation training.



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