Background and context

The African continent is currently grappling with a series of coups, which have unfolded amidst escalating insecurity. The situation is compounded by the governance deficit, further exacerbated by the worsening effects of climate change and the deepening humanitarian, food security, and livelihood crises. The frequency of these coups in Africa remains unabated, underscoring the urgent need for intervention, despite the sanctions placed on the countries and the suspension by the African Union. The spate of recent coups in Africa is showing no sign of abating. Since 2020, in just three years, 13 coup attempts have taken place in Africa, eight of them successful in seizing power in Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Sudan[1]. The recent unconstitutional change of government of 30 August 2023, through a military coup that overthrew President Ali Bongo Ondimba in Gabon, marked the 100th successful military coup in Africa since independence. Notably, nine of these cases happened in the last four years only. As of the beginning of 2024, seven African countries are undergoing post-coup transitions: Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan.[2]. Most of these countries are situated in West and Central Africa, particularly within the Sahel region, where instability has surged due to unconstitutional government changes (UCG). Each country has a formal transition timeline and roadmap, except Niger, which is yet to adopt such a plan. However, Chad and Mali have already exceeded their initial transition timelines. Furthermore, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are confronted with serious security challenges that have resulted in the death of thousands of civilians in addition to defence and security personnel. This also raises the questions for military governance vis a vis civilians led democratic governance, especially in West and Central Africa region.

The latest 2022 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) findings for Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger highlight an overall declining Governance and security situation and a shrinking participatory environment over the years 2017 to 2021. Further analysis using data from 2021 onwards shows that coups did not have a positive impact on the security situations they allegedly aimed to address – but, on the contrary, brought higher insecurity and worsening domestic circumstances, the deteriorating rule of law and participation, exacerbating the demand and supply of illicit arms and ammunition. In short, whatever the failings of existing regimes may be, a coup is never a solution. Moreover, the demographic dividend in these countries which has a growing youth population is deeply affected by the emergence of coups being seen as a temporary solutions to democratic governance decline.

The African Union has adopted progressing normative frameworks to promote and consolidate democracy, which has been ratified by member states. These normative frameworks provide for sanctions if member states breach their provisions. In addition, both ECOWAS and ECCES have applied the principle of subsidiarity/complementarity to respond to unconstitutional developments in some of these countries. Following the Protocol on Relations between the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the principle of subsidiarity is founded on the idea that sustainable peace is possible if conflict resolution mechanisms are led by actors who are culturally, geopolitically, and strategically close to the crisis in question. In the African context, mediation should be directly supported and, where appropriate, led by Regional Economic Communities (RECs), in collaboration with the African Union so that intergovernmental organisations are seen speaking with one voice in the spirit of regional integration.

In reaction to these cases of UCG, the AU and the two regional organizations most concerned here, namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), have, at varying degrees, imposed sanctions on the countries in transition in compliance with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (Chapter 8-Sanctions in Cases of Unconstitutional Changes of Government. Article 23), Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on the framework for an OAU response to unconstitutional changes of government (AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI)) and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. In addition, ECOWAS’s response and imposition of sanctions on the erring members was in compliance with the organization’s Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security established in 2001. The sanctions had been applied to erring member states in the past since their adoption in the protocol 22 years before the coups in Niger, Chad, and Mali. In order words, the sanctions were not established specifically for the three countries. Several observers and affected citizens have criticked some of these sanctions, considering them as harsh and “blind” or “indiscriminate.” To some, they affect innocent civilians more than transition authorities who are supposedly their primary or only targets. It should be noted that the sanctions were established with the full support of the same member states complaining of the harshness in 2001 as ECOWAS establishment of policies is by general consensus. 

One major regional dynamic that has added to the complexity of the management of current transitions is the joint announcement made on 28 January by the military rulers of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger of their decision to withdraw from ECOWAS “with immediate effect”. This has further underscored the challenges face in effectively managing political transition and enforcing democratic norms. What does this mean for their transition processes, particularly their roadmaps agreed with the West African regional bloc? As they cite sanctions imposed on some of them as one of the reasons for their decision, what lessons can the AU, especially the PSC, the UN and regional organisations draw from this? This necessitates a deeper reflection by the AU, UN, and other regional organizations regarding the implications of such withdrawals and their impact on transition dynamics.

In response to these challenges, the UNDP and the AU Commission jointly launched the Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT) in July 2023. AFSIT aims to provide integrated programmatic support to African countries undergoing complex political transitions, including both countries having experienced or at risk of UCG. Its overall objective is to support credible, inclusive, and legitimate transition roadmaps, mechanisms, and institutions towards a return to constitutional rule, democracy, and stability in relevant countries. The facility coordinates and complements relevant AU, RECs, and UN instruments, as well as other development partners’ instruments and initiatives to ensure coherence and maximize impact in supporting inclusive transitions and sustaining democratic gains across the continent.

Objectives and expected outcomes of the conference

The main objectives of the conference are twofold: (a) assessment of ongoing transition - take stock of the trajectory of ongoing transitions and the challenges they may face and (b) formulation of actionable strategies and actions susceptible to both overcome these challenges and ensure that these transitions lead to more positively transformed societies and countries.

Specifically, the high-level dialogue aims at achieving the following results, among others:

• Carry out a critical retrospective analysis of the ongoing transitions in the two regions to see their levels of progress and challenges being faced in the implementation of their transition roadmaps.
• Critically analyse the institutional responses of the AU, the two RECs, the UN, and other relevant multilateral organisations.
• Reflect on the concrete actions that the AU, RECs, and UN can do to help inclusive transitions, in political, security and development fields. 
• Facilitate an unbiased interrogation of the types and effectiveness of sanctions so far devised in cases of UCG and see the alignment with the root causes of UCGs.
• Inquire about the correlations between democratic backsliding and security challenges on the one hand, and the upsurge of UCGs on the other, and reflect on what the AU and regional organisations, in partnership with the UN, can do to ensure improved democratic rule and stability in the countries of the two regions.

Main targets and participants

This high-level dialogue will bring together representatives of the AU, UN (UNOWAS, UNOCA, DCO, UNDP), ECOWAS and ECCAS.

Methodology

The high-level dialogue will be held over two days and in-person. It will be preceded by a dedicated session/workshop with CSOs to get their perspectives on challenges and opportunities for deepening democracy, good governance, and inclusive political transition processes in the two regions. These will feed into the high-level dialogue.

The high-level dialogue will be organised around the various thematic issues that underpin the specific objectives mentioned above. These thematic issues will be the subjects of specific or combined sessions with representatives of various categories of participants making introductory remarks followed by in-depth exchanges with those on the floor. While the exchanges will be in closed door sessions, the media will be allowed during the opening and closing sessions.

The conference will be held in both English and French with simultaneous interpretation available.

[1] ps://mo.ibrahim.foundation/sites/default/files/2023-09/coup-never-solution.pdf

[2] Sudan’s transition process is on hold since a full-blown war erupted in the country mid-way into its initial timeline. In any case, the country falls beyond the purview of the regional focus of this conference.