Background

The African continent is currently grappling with a series of coups, which have unfolded amidst escalating insecurity. The situation is compounded by the governance deficit, further exacerbated by the worsening effects of climate change and the deepening humanitarian, food security, and livelihood crises. The frequency of these coups in Africa remains unabated, underscoring the urgent need for intervention. The spate of recent coups in Africa is showing no sign of abating.

Since 2020, in just three years, 13 coup attempts have taken place in Africa, eight of them successful in seizing power in Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Sudan. The recent unconstitutional change of government of 30 August 2023, through a military coup that overthrew President Ali Bongo Ondimba in Gabon, marked the 100th successful military coup in Africa since independence. Nine of these cases happened in the last four years only. At the beginning of 2024, seven African countries are undergoing post-coup transitions: Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Sudan. All the countries, save Sudan, are located in the Sahelian corridors of West and Central Africa. This makes the Sahel, the epicenter of Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) in recent times. Each of these countries has a formal transition timeline and roadmap, except Niger, which is yet to adopt one. Two of the countries comprising Chad and Mali have already exceeded their initial transition timelines while Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are confronted with serious security challenges that have resulted in the death of thousands of civilians including defense and security personnel.

Findings from the 2022 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) for Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger highlight that between 2017 to 2021, there was an overall decline in governance and security situation as well as a shrinking participatory environment in these countries. Further trend analysis from 2021 indicates that coups reinforced insecurities and worsened domestic circumstances, deteriorated the rule of law and exacerbated the proliferation of illicit arms and light weapons. These negative indices present further justification against UCG as an option to democracy. It violates democratic tenets and represents a threat to peace, stability and security in the continent.

Through its adopted instruments and protocols, the African Union has been committed to promoting and consolidating democracy in member states. These normative frameworks, with their sanction regimes, serve as deterrence against violating member states. Regional Economic Communities such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in line with the principle of subsidiarity and complementarity, also applied corresponding obligatory sanctions to UCG member states within its Community in line with the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance as well as the 1999 Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

Specifically, the AU imposed sanctions on UCG countries in compliance with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (Chapter 8: Article 23-Sanctions in Cases of Unconstitutional Changes of Government), Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on the framework for an OAU response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI)) and the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

These sanctions have been criticized for its economic and social impact on the civilian population, which has been exploited by the military governments to consolidate their grip on power while discrediting regional and continental efforts and roadmap to return these countries to democratic governance.

These UCGs represents a growing trend of democratic backsliding in the continent as a result of systemic failures and a tendency by many African leaders to manipulate the constitution through ‘constitutional coups’ in other to extend their term-limit in office. This was clearly highlighted in the recent UNDP flagship report, Soldiers and Citizens: Military Coups and the Need for Democratic Renewal in Africa (2023). This situation creates a growing negative perception by African citizens about democracy and the silent position of Inter governmental Agencies and the African Union often accused of weak or zero response when leaders of member states perpetuate themselves in power.

Thus, there is the urgent need to reflect on the motivations behind coups which can vary depending on specific context but generally ranging from political grievances and power struggles to ideological or social reasons which is largely due governance or democracy deficits leading to massive corruption and inefficient service delivery to citizens. Additional challenges emerge from the strategic or political decision-making structures of RECs and at the AU which impedes efforts to further strengthen obligations and commitments to democratic principles and ideals. For instance, ECOWAS has since 2015, been trying to reform its 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance to include enforced term limits by Member States but continues to face opposition by some Heads of State and Authority.

Civil society organizations have been instrumental in the promotion and strengthening of democracy in Africa and have been at the forefront of campaigns against the current wave of UCGs. For example, several CSOs participated inthe March 2022 Accra Reflection Forum on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) in Africa as well as the follow up Accra CSO Forum that took place from 26 to 27 October 2023 that deliberated on the preceding March 2022 recommendations and response to the resurgence of UCGs.

Such initiatives are pivotal to enhance democratic ethos and to galvanize regional political and democratic reforms. This could build the momentum for responsive actions at the level of RECs such as ECOWAS to strengthen regional instruments such as the 2001 supplementary Protocol that could deter further weakening of democracy while countering opportunities for autocratic regimes and UCGs.

Exploring the CSO dimension becomes significant especially within the context of current regional dynamics that has added to the complexity of the political challenges especially in West Africa. First with the 28 January 2024 announcement by UCG countries of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso of their withdrawal of Membership from ECOWAS to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and second, the subsequent announcements by Mali and Burkina Faso military governments to rule for another five years beyond the transition period agreed with ECOWAS, places democracy and regional stability and integration agenda of ECOWAS in jeopardy. The question is what can CSOs do to avoid stem the current wave of democratic downturn and regional political instability? How will such initiative complement regional efforts by RECs such as ECOWAS or ECCAS to mitigate further deterioration which undermines its regional oversight and credibility?

It is within these realizations that motivated the development of the Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT) jointly designed by UNDP and the AU Commission, launched in July 2023, to provide integrated programmatic support to African countries undergoing complex political transitions, including countries experiencing UCG or at-risk military coup. With AFSIT, AU and UNDP takes on the commitment to support credible, inclusive and legitimate transition roadmaps, mechanisms and institutions towards a return to constitutional rule, democracyand stability in relevant countries of the continent. The Facility offers the space for multistakeholder response to the challenges of democracy, good governance and political stability. A further reflection is therefore through inclusive forums to explore CSOs potential as a complimentary partner to ongoing efforts to stem the tide of democratic backslide while facilitating initatives that support inclusive transitions in Africa.

Objectives and expected outcomes of the Forum

1. To take stock of the progress of ongoing political transitions and its challenges
2. To formulate actionable recommendations for effective strategies and actions capable to overcome these challenges in order to ensure that these transitions lead to more positively transformed policies.

The expected outcome include:

• An in-depth appreciation and comprehensive experiential understanding of the state of political transitions in the West and Central Africa including progress and challenges faced in the implementation of the transition roadmaps.
• Concrete actions by the AU, RECs and UN working with CSOs on how to support inclusive transitions in Member States
• Actionable recommendations that build on the nature and effectiveness of sanctions on UCG countries;
• Key CSO recommendations to support the High-Level Dialogue on the role of the UN and AU in supporting peaceful and inclusive transitions in West and Central Africa as a follow up to the Forum.

Participants:

The CSO forum will bring together 30-45 representatives of CSOs from West and Central Africa working on issues aligned with the objectives of the Forum. Additional participation will include the AU, UNDP, UNOWAS, ECOWAS and political missions.

Methodology:

The CSO Forum will be held over two days and in person as a prelude to a High-Level meeting on the role of the UN and AU in supporting inclusive transitions in West and Central Africa. It will be organized around thematic sessions related to UCGs, political transitions, good governance and democracy in Africa.